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Summary
How to Offer the Right Products at the Right Time
and in the Right Quantity
Jochen Schlapp
Across virtually all industries, firms share one common objective: they strive to match
their supply with customer demand. To achieve this goal, firms need to offer the right
products at the right time and in the right quantity. Only firms that excel in all three
dimensions can provide products with a high customer value and achieve extraordinary
profits. This thesis investigates specific challenges that a firm has to overcome on its
way to a good match between supply and demand. The first essay investigates how a
firm can already select the right products during the product development phase. To
make good resource allocation decisions, the firm needs to collect valuable information,
and incentivize information sharing across the entire organization. The key result is
that the firm needs to balance individual and shared incentives to achieve this goal.
However, such compensation schemes come at the cost of overly broad product portfolios.
The second essay examines how uncertain customer demand patterns affect seasonal
products. Specifically, the timing of the product’s availability is crucial. Too early, and
high opportunity and inventory costs may devour profits. Too late, and the firm loses
its customers. In short, the firm has to balance a product’s market potential with the
costly market time. This tradeoff may induce a firm to stock more inventories to satisfy a
smaller market potential. Lastly, the third essay investigates how customer substitution
influences the inventory decisions of different supply chain members in the presence of
upstream competition. We find that customer substitution has a non-monotonic effect
on the supply chain members’ decisions, and that left-over inventories may decline even
when initial inventories are raised.
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Across virtually all industries, firms share one common objective: they strive to match
their supply with customer demand (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2009, p. 2). This is a
demanding task even for the most successful firms since customer demand is, in general,
hard to predict. However, the rewards of outperforming rival firms on this challenge
are substantial. By better matching supply with demand a firm can reduce costs and
increase revenues. Thereby, the firm can operate more profitably and ultimately create
a sustainable competitive advantage. For any firm, the key to a better match between
supply and demand is to offer the right products at the right time and in the right quantity
(Lee, 2004; Slone, 2004). Only firms that excel in all three dimensions can provide
products with a high customer value and achieve extraordinary profits. Interestingly,
already falling short of one of these three dimensions is sufficient for products to fail in
the market place. As the following examples illustrate, evidence for this phenomenon
abounds in practice.
For instance, choosing the right products is of utmost importance in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, where product development costs are tremendous. As reported in DiMasi
et al. (2003), the total drug development costs for a single product can easily reach $800
million. Naturally, when making such huge investments in bad products that later “flop”
on the market or do not receive approval due to adverse side effects, firms eventually
suffer from eroding profits. “Blockbuster” products, in contrast, boost firm profits, as
these products can easily generate annual revenues exceeding $1 billion (Girotra et al.,
2007). As such, in the pharmaceutical industry, firm performance is closely related to
top management’s ability to reliably select the right products for development.
Yet, simply offering the right product is not enough. In 2009, the swine flu pandemic
spread all over Europe. To reduce the number of infections and to avoid a presumed high
mortality rate in the population, government agencies together with the pharmaceutical
industry intended to provide vaccination that should help immunize the population.
In Germany, such a vaccine was made publicly available at the end of October 2009.
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By this time, however, the number of new infections had already peaked and people
were realizing that the adverse effects of the swine flu were rather weak (Seuchen-Info,
2010). Due to this observation, the population considered the vaccination as unnecessary,
and vaccine demand dropped dramatically. This development had disastrous financial
implications. From the overall production of 34 million doses, 29 million doses remained
idle and had to be destroyed at the end of the flu season. The total costs of this mistimed
market introduction were estimated to surpass $300 million (Brisen˜o, 2011).
Cisco Systems Inc. is a famous example for a company that experienced the severe
repercussions of offering the right products at the right time but in the wrong quantity.
Due to unexpectedly strong demand, Cisco faced a $3.8 billion backlog in customer orders
in October 2000 (Lakenan et al., 2001). Because this inventory shortage clearly limited
Cisco’s profitability, Cisco heavily expanded production capacities to build sufficient
stocks to meet future customer demand. During this adaptation of the desired inventory
levels, however, customer demand massively dropped. Eventually, Cisco was forced to
write-down $2.25 billion in inventories in 2001 due to excessive stocks.
The above examples clearly demonstrate that a firm has to overcome manifold
challenges on its way to a good match between supply and demand. Importantly, these
challenges evolve dynamically over time as a product matures. At the very beginning,
the firm’s most important task is to choose the right products and to allocate scarce
resources across multiple product ideas. Then, once a product is fully developed, the
firm has to decide on the right time to make the product available on the market. Finally,
after the product’s introduction, the firm has to keep the right quantity of inventories
on stock to best satisfy customer demand. Moreover, firms also have to account for
the mutual interdependencies between these fundamental decisions. This dissertation
examines specific challenges that a firm experiences during these three different stages of
a product’s life, and provides explicit guidance on how to efficiently manage the tradeoffs
involved.
The first essay (joined work with Nektarios Oraiopoulos and Vincent Mak), pre-
sented in Chapter II, investigates a significant organizational challenge that is inherent
to many R&D projects: How can a firm get informed opinions about a product’s future
market value when the people with the best information are the ones who most want to
see their product succeed? This problem is particularly relevant when the different units
who run these R&D projects compete among each other for scarce resources. Given the
high uncertainty embedded in R&D projects, firms struggle to detect the most promising
2
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projects early on. To overcome these difficulties and to make good resource allocation
decisions, the firm needs to collect valuable information. However, information sharing
among the different units cannot be taken for granted. Instead, individual units need
to be incentivized to not only evaluate their projects thoroughly, but also to truthfully
reveal their findings. The former requires an emphasis on individual performance, while
the latter relies on the existence of a common goal across the organization. Motivated
by this commonly observed tension, we address the following question: How can a firm
incentivize individual project teams to exert effort to improve the evaluation of their
own projects, and at the same time achieve cooperation and information sharing across
the different teams?
To answer this question, we develop a game-theoretic model that combines moral
hazard during the product evaluation stage with adverse selection during the information
revelation stage. In essence, the firm needs to design an incentive scheme that induces
project managers to exert effort ex-ante, and to truthfully disclose their findings ex-post.
Our analysis reveals that such a contract must incorporate a combination of individual
and shared incentives, i.e., a bonus for the manager’s own performance and a bonus
for the firm’s overall performance. Interestingly, we find that managerial compensation
decreases in the manager’s quality of information: the more precise a manager can
determine his product’s future market value, the lower his expected compensation. Our
study also explores how the incentive misalignment between the managers and the firm
affects the firm’s evaluation strategy. The firm’s limited ability to infer the managers’
private information can lead to an under- or over-investment in information. Yet, the
firm always spreads its resources into too many products.
Chapter III (joined work with Moritz Fleischmann) looks at two different sources of
uncertainty that a firm is confronted with when offering seasonal products. Specifically,
for many seasonal products, firms do not only experience uncertainty in the magnitude
of customer demand, but also in the timing of the product’s actual selling season. This
is particularly true for products that are heavily affected by exogenous factors such as
weather conditions or the spread of diseases. For these products, a fundamental challenge
for each firm is to determine how much inventory to stock, and equally importantly, when
to make the products available for sale. Too early, and high opportunity and inventory
costs may devour profits. Too late, and the firm loses its customers. Given the need
to balance these two adverse effects, we answer the following research question: For a
seasonal product, what inventory timing and scale should a firm choose to best satisfy
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uncertain customer demand over an uncertain selling season?
To address this question, we build an analytical framework that allows a firm to
simultaneously choose its inventory scale and timing in order to effectively manage both
sources of demand uncertainty. Our results establish that the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy aims at resolving two intertwined tradeoffs. While the demand scale uncertainty
gives rise for the classical newsvendor tradeoff, the timing uncertainty creates a tension
between the product’s market potential and its market time. In combination, these
two tradeoffs create a subtle interaction between the firm’s inventory scale and the
inventory timing. Surprisingly, we find that the firm may raise its inventory levels
when the product’s market potential decreases. This happens because the firm can at
the same time shorten the product’s availability period, and a shorter selling season is
cheaper to serve. Importantly, we also show that the timing uncertainty has more severe
repercussions on a product’s profitability than an unknown demand scale. The reason
for this finding is that the firm is not able to lower the product’s inventory costs without
at the same time reducing the product’s market potential.
The study presented in Chapter IV (joined work with Moritz Fleischmann) takes
a different perspective by focusing on a specific coordination issue arising in supply
chains. In particular, we investigate how customer substitution influences the inventory
decisions of different supply chain members in the presence of upstream competition and
vertical information asymmetry among the supply chain partners. Our study is moti-
vated by our observations in the agrochemical market. This market is shaped by two
key characteristics: customers have a high willingness to buy substitute products in case
of stock-outs, and manufacturers initiate their production long before the wholesalers
commit to their final order quantities. As a result, making good inventory decisions is
a challenging task for both manufacturers and wholesalers. This is true because manu-
facturers have only limited information about the wholesaler’s future order quantities,
and they need to anticipate their rivals’ behavior and the indirect effects of substituting
customers. The wholesaler, in turn, is restricted in his decision by the manufacturers’
inventory decisions. Additionally, the wholesaler has to balance inventories across prod-
ucts in order to successfully manage the direct effects of customer substitution. Inspired
by these observations, we study the following question: Given customer substitution and
a finite selling season, what are the optimal inventory decisions of different members of
a supply chain?
To answer this question, we study a two-stage supply chain in which potentially mul-
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tiple manufacturers sell partially substitutable products for a single season through a
monopolistic wholesaler. Our analysis establishes the wholesaler’s optimal inventory de-
cision. We find that inventory levels are non-monotonic in the manufacturers’ production
decision and customer substitution rates. Interestingly, the wholesaler may increase in-
ventories for a product although customers are more willing to substitute away from this
product. We find that these counter-intuitive results are the more prominent, the more
heterogeneous the products and the higher the customers’ willingness to buy substitute
products. We also explore a manufacturer’s optimal inventory decision. Surprisingly,
our study reveals that inventories may decrease under competition. This happens be-
cause a monopolistic manufacturer can coordinate the availability of all products, while
such an availability tradeoff is impossible under competition. Moreover, we show that
a manufacturer’s left-over inventories at the end of the selling season may decline even
when initial inventories are raised.
5
Chapter II
Resource Allocation Decisions under
Imperfect Evaluation
with Nektarios Oraiopoulos and Vincent Mak1
2.1 Introduction
Launching new products has always been a daunting task even for the most successful
organizations. Scholars early on highlighted that given the high uncertainty embedded
in such projects, identifying the “winners” upfront is rather unlikely, and as such, com-
mitting substantial resources early on may not always be the most prudent strategy.
Instead, scholars suggest that a firm should engage in parallel pursuits, and refine its
resource allocation decisions as more information becomes available (Nelson, 1961). A
parallel search approach allows a firm to explore a much broader set of ideas (Kor-
nish and Ulrich, 2011), develop a much more robust and adaptable business strategy
(Beinhocker, 1999), and gain a competitive advantage in environments characterized
by unforeseeable uncertainty and complex performance landscapes (Sommer and Loch,
2004). Despite these indisputable benefits, the management of parallel projects involves
substantial challenges. A fundamental one stems from the fact that these projects of-
ten co-exist within a product portfolio, and therefore, compete with each other for the
same scarce resources. This challenge is widespread in companies that manage parallel
projects and is nicely summarized in Sharpe and Keelin (1998, p.45): “how do you make
good decisions, in a high-risk, technically complex business when the information you
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Resource Allocation Decisions
under Imperfect Evaluation and Organizational Dynamics”, coauthored with Nektarios Oraiopoulos
and Vincent Mak.
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need to make those decisions comes largely from the project champions who are compet-
ing against one another for resources?” This is the primary question we address in this
essay.
This question is particularly relevant in industries where tough resource allocation
decisions need to be made. For example, given its skyrocketing costs and its highly un-
certain nature, the pharmaceutical industry has been struggling to improve its decision
making processes. Consider the recent restructuring of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) dis-
cussed in Huckman and Strick (2010). When GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham
merged in 2000, the new company announced the creation of six independent Centers of
Excellence for Drug Discovery (CEDD) focused on different therapeutic areas, a unique
concept that sought to bring the entrepreneurial culture of a biotech R&D to the gigan-
tic new company. If a compound progressed through Phase IIa, the leadership of the
CEDD unit would present the compound to the centralized Development Investment
Board (DIB) which would ultimately decide whether the compound would receive the
substantial resources required to progress to Phase IIb. A key aspect of this restruc-
turing was the incentive scheme which, in an effort to promote decentralization and
mimic small biotech companies, offered substantial rewards to scientists and executives
for progressing compounds that originated from their own CEDD. Naturally, this policy
raised serious concerns about the emergence of ferocious competition among the different
CEDDs.
A diametrically opposite reward structure was adopted by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals
(Huckman et al., 2010). The fundamental premise of Wyeth’s restructuring efforts was
to motivate scientists to look beyond their departmental “silos” and strengthen synergies
across the various therapeutic areas, and as such, the bonuses of all eligible scientists in
R&D were based on the degree to which the entire organization achieved its objectives.
In general, promoting such synergies is perceived to be beneficial for organizations, but in
the case of running parallel projects it is often considered absolutely vital as such shared
incentives facilitate better communication across the organization. This is stressed in
Loch et al. (2006, ch. 6) who argue that the successful implementation of running parallel
projects critically relies on the ability of top management to elicit credible information
from their product development teams, and subsequently disseminate this information
to the rest of the organization. This information, in turn, is the key to efficient resource
allocation decisions that strengthen “star” projects and abandon “flops”. Under this
collective reward policy, however, a key concern at Wyeth was that it failed to reward
7
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exceptional achievements by specific project teams.
The goal of this essay is to understand how a firm should design its incentive schemes
in order to balance these two opposing forces: to incentivize individual project teams
to exert effort to improve the evaluation of their own projects with the need to achieve
cooperation and information sharing across the different project teams. Specifically, and
given the information-intensive nature of such resource allocation decision processes, we
address the following question: how can a firm balance individual and shared incentives,
so that its product managers are willing to acquire the necessary information, and equally
importantly, to share it with the rest of the organization?
It is worth noting that in such highly technical and complex environments as the
ones faced in the pharmaceutical industry, neither the acquisition nor the dissemination
of reliable information can be dictated by traditional top-down management approaches.
As Sharpe and Keelin (1998) explain, traditional top-down approaches are ineffective be-
cause no single executive could know enough about the highly complex projects that the
company is considering. Moreover, even the most sophisticated quantitative approaches
have limited value given that it is impossible for senior management to see the “quality
of thinking”2 behind those valuations. As a result, project funding decisions were pri-
marily driven by the advocacy skills of project champions. The following quote by one of
the executives highlights quite vividly his perception regarding the lack of transparency
in the evaluation process: “Figures don’t lie, but liars can figure.” (Sharpe and Keelin,
1998, p. 46). To capture these two key aspects of the decision making process, we
develop a game-theoretic model that combines moral hazard ex-ante (at the information
acquisition stage) with adverse selection ex-post (at the information revelation stage).
Our study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, we show that
by offering a combination of individual and shared incentives, the firm can incentivize
managers to undertake highly accurate evaluation efforts and to truthfully disclose their
findings. Interestingly, more accurate information leads to lower pay-performance sen-
sitivity for both the individual and shared incentives. This highlights a key difference
between incentivizing information acquisition and inducing higher efforts in a moral haz-
ard setting where an agent’s effort (stochastically) improves the outcome of the project.
For the latter, standard principal-agent theory suggests that pay-performance sensitivity
increases as the effort has more influence on the final outcome, i.e., as the environment
2This term was used by one of the executives in Sharpe and Keelin (1998) to illustrate that senior
managers could not rank these recommendations with respect to their rigor or robustness.
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becomes less noisy (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979). In contrast, we show that if the agent can
obtain a less noisy signal about the outcome, his pay-performance sensitivity decreases.
Moreover, the total wage of a project manager decreases as the accuracy of his infor-
mation increases. The reason behind this counter-intuitive finding is that, through the
incentive mechanism, more accurate information leads to a better alignment between the
managers’ and the firm’s interests, thereby reducing the managers’ information rents.
Second, we show that the misalignment of incentives (hereafter referred to as de-
centralization) between the firm and its product managers has a non-uniform effect on
the firm’s product evaluation strategy (i.e., the decision on how much information to
acquire ex-ante). As we would expect, decentralization increases the effective cost of
such information, and therefore, for a wide range of parameters, the firm under-invests
in information acquisition. However, for intermediate information acquisition costs and
very reliable information, decentralization may lead the firm to over-invest in informa-
tion. This result is driven by top management’s inability to distinguish informative
signals from uninformative ones when project managers possess private information.
Importantly, this has implications for the firm’s product portfolio scope: decentraliza-
tion is driving the firm to spread its resources into too many products. Lastly, our
analysis identifies under what conditions higher information accuracy and acquisition
costs might amplify or mitigate the firm’s profit losses and the total welfare losses due
to decentralization.
2.2 Related Literature
The challenges associated with resource allocation processes have been central in the
new product development (NPD) literature. A thorough review of this literature can be
found in Kavadias and Chao (2007). Recently, an emerging stream has accounted for the
decentralized nature of modern NPD processes (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Siemsen, 2008;
Chao et al., 2009; Sommer and Loch, 2009; Mihm, 2010; Mihm et al., 2010; Xiao and Xu,
2012) and the reality that incentive mechanisms play a central role in such processes.
The effect of incentive schemes on the effectiveness of resource allocation processes is
more explicitly studied in Chao et al. (2009), Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2013),
and Chao et al. (2013). Chao et al. (2009) compare a policy in which a senior manager
empowers the divisional manager to adapt the innovation budget to the divisional sales
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versus a policy in which the senior manager directly controls the division through a fixed
budget. Hutchison-Krupat and Kavadias (2013) characterize optimal funding decisions
across different resource allocation processes such as top-down, bottom-up, and strategic
buckets. Lastly, Chao et al. (2013) study incentive schemes in a stage-gate process where
senior management has to rely on a privately informed project manager in order to
make go/no-go decisions. They emphasize the role of uncertainty regarding the quality
of the project idea, and show how it might make an organization overly conservative
in its project selection process, i.e., projects that would have been profitable do not
get approved. We contribute in the above stream of resource allocation processes by
capturing the dynamics arising when multiple product managers compete for the same
resources. All of the aforementioned papers are concerned with the level of resources
allocated to a single product, and as such, they do not address the challenges associated
with managing a portfolio of projects.
To our knowledge, the only other paper that analyzes incentives for parallel projects
is Ederer (2013). By combining both a theoretical and experimental analysis, he shows
that when workers can freely learn the best practices from each other, the firm can only
incentivize innovation by establishing group incentives. This happens because individ-
ual pay-for-performance incentive schemes encourage imitation and free-riding on the
successful ideas of others. While we also highlight the importance of group incentives
for an organization developing new products, our work differs from Ederer (2013) in
several aspects. Most notably, in our setting the outcome of the product evaluation is
not public information, and thus, the firm needs to incentivize the managers to reveal
their information truthfully. Another recent stream of work in NPD has studied parallel
search in the context of innovation tournaments (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Kornish and
Ulrich, 2011; Boudreau et al., 2011), but the tradeoffs involved in these settings are con-
siderably different than the resource allocation decisions within a single firm. As such,
despite the extensive discussion in the NPD community about the necessity of running
parallel projects (see Loch et al., 2006, and references therein) we know very little about
how to manage such a process within the boundaries of the firm.
Our work also touches upon a central question in the capital budgeting literature
in corporate finance. The stream most related to our setting begins with the seminal
work of Stein (1997) which focuses on the role of corporate headquarters in allocating
resources among competing projects. In particular, he compares the efficiency of inter-
nal capital markets with respect to the external ones. In a series of follow-up papers,
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Bernardo et al. (2001), Stein (2002), and Inderst and Laux (2005) examine the role of
incentives in mitigating agency costs, and specifically, the potential private benefits that
agents enjoy from controlling more capital, thereby reflecting a preference for “empire
building”. Closer to our work, Friebel and Raith (2010) develop a model in which pay-
for-performance incentives create an endogenous empire building motive, which in turn,
might prevent a manager from truthfully communicating his private information. They
show that the firm can induce truthful communication by using shared incentives, and
they compare the benefits and costs of integration once such information rents are taken
into account.
All of the above papers assume that information regarding the type of the project
is perfect and freely available to the agent, but not to the principal. On the contrary, in
our setting, acquiring reliable information is associated with substantial costs incurred
privately by the agent, and thus, the agent will only exert that effort if he is incentivized
to do so. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper that studies project selection
when the agent is incentivized to acquire costly information is Lambert (1986). Our
model, however, differs in a number of ways. Most notably, Lambert (1986) considers a
single-agent setting, and as such, his model does not address the issues that we discussed
earlier regarding competition for resources among parallel projects.
2.3 Model Setup
Consider a firm that is faced with the decision of allocating its resources across multiple
projects. The key decision for the firm is whether to choose a narrow product portfolio
scope or a broader one. To capture this tradeoff in a mathematically tractable way,
we assume that the firm is contemplating two projects, and we examine under what
conditions the firm decides to allocate all of its resources in a single project (narrow
scope) versus spreading them evenly across both projects (broad scope). The market
value that the firm realizes from each project depends on two parameters: (i) the inherent
market potential of each project, which is uncertain upfront and can be either good or
bad; and (ii) the resources that the firm invests in the project. The firm seeks to
maximize its profits by allocating resources to good projects and forgoing investments
in bad ones.
A central element of our model is the product evaluation stage in which the firm
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can acquire costly information regarding each project’s potential. This information is
acquired through extensive experimentation by each project’s respective product man-
ager. Then, upon observing the outcome of this experimentation process, each product
manager makes a recommendation to the senior management of the firm (from hereon,
the firm), and the firm decides how much resources to allocate in each project. For exam-
ple, in the case of GSK, the head of each R&D unit (i.e., of each CEDD) would present
a compound to the centralized Development Investment Board, and subsequently, the
board members would decide about the progress of the compound in the next stage (the
extremely resource-intensive Phase IIb). Similarly, at Wyeth there was a centralized
Discovery Review Board that was responsible for making funding decisions across all
therapeutic areas. As discussed extensively in the aforementioned examples, the “qual-
ity of thinking” behind such recommendations by the product managers is very hard to
verify, and even less so to contract upon. As such, there can be considerable information
asymmetry between the product managers and the firm.
In our setting, the presence of information asymmetry is reflected both in the “qual-
ity of thinking” as well as in the truthfulness of the recommendation that the product
managers submit to the firm. We model the former by acknowledging that information
acquisition (e.g., experimentation) is a costly process and can be done at various levels
of quality (e.g., robustness checks may satisfy only some minimum standards, or may
be very thorough). In particular, we assume that each product manager can choose
between a high-effort and a low-effort evaluation process for his product. The chosen
effort level is not observed by the firm. For the manager, high-effort evaluation comes
with a private cost, while the cost of low-effort evaluation is normalized to zero. The
latter form of information asymmetry aims to capture the fact that not all product man-
agers truthfully communicate the results of their experimentation, especially when they
compete for resources with one another. In short, our model incorporates ex-ante moral
hazard (at the information acquisition stage) with ex-post adverse selection (at the rec-
ommendation stage), and as such, if the firm desires high-effort product evaluation and
truthful recommendations, it has to design appropriate incentive schemes. Lastly, upon
observing the managers’ recommendation, the firm decides on its resource allocation
strategy.
To summarize, the sequence of events is as follows (see Figure 2.1): (i) The firm
announces the compensation scheme to the product managers; (ii) Each manager chooses
his evaluation effort levels and incurs the associated private effort costs; (iii) Then, each
12
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manager observes a private and imperfect signal and makes a recommendation to the
firm regarding his product’s potential; (iv) Based on the managers’ recommendations,
the firm allocates resources to the products; (v) The products are launched and their
market value is realized. The firm receives the corresponding payoffs and compensates
its managers. In the following three subsections, we explain our modeling assumptions
regarding the above stages in more detail.
Figure 2.1.: Timing of events.



















The Product Evaluation Stage
New projects carry significant uncertainty regarding their market potential. We capture
this uncertainty by assuming that two ex-ante identical products i and j can either have
high (θi = G) or low (θi = B) market potential.
3 The true potential of each product is
unknown to the firm and its managers, and both states are considered ex-ante equally
likely.4 By evaluating his product, manager i receives an imperfect signal si ∈ {g, b}
which indicates whether product i has high (si = g) or low (si = b) market potential.
In line with prior work on NPD (Loch et al., 2001; Thomke, 2007), we capture the
informativeness of the signal for both products i and j by the parameter q to which we
refer to as signal fidelity. Mathematically, q represents the conditional probability that
the signal is reflective of the true market potential, i.e., Pr(si = g|θi = G) = Pr(si =
b|θi = B) = q. Importantly, the fidelity q depends on the chosen effort level ei which
can be high (ei = h) or low (ei = l). High-effort evaluation requires a cost c > 0





. In contrast, low effort is costless for the product manager, but results in
3For notational simplicity, we define explicitly only the parameters for project i. An identical set of
parameters applies for product j as well.
4This assumption is done for expositional clarity and does not affect qualitatively any of our results.
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an uninformative signal, i.e., q = 1
2
. Note that our assumptions cover the full range of
product evaluation difficulty. We capture products that are so complex such that high-
effort product evaluation only leads to a marginal information gain, and we also capture
very simple products for which high-effort evaluation perfectly reveals the product’s
market potential.
Upon observing the signal si, manager i revises his prior belief for his product’s
market potential to account for the new information. In particular, since both states are
ex-ante equally likely, the posterior beliefs are given by Pr(θi = G|si = g) = Pr(θi =
B|si = b) = q. Then, manager i submits his recommendation mi ∈ {g, b} about his
product’s potential to the firm. If mi = si, then a manager truthfully reveals his signal.
Thus, manager i’s action space is fully characterized by his product evaluation effort, ei,
and his subsequent recommendation, mi.
The Resource Allocation Stage
Once the firm receives the managers’ recommendations, then it has to decide on whether
to allocate all of its resources to a single product or split them evenly between products
i and j. The market value to the firm generated by product i, denoted by νi, depends
on both, its inherent potential θi as well as the amount of resources invested in it.
More specifically, we assume that if product i has a bad market potential (θi =
B), then it generates zero market value regardless of the resources invested into it.
Similarly, a product that has a good potential (θi = G), but does not receive any
resources for development, also generates zero market value. In contrast, for products of
good potential that receive resources, their generated value increases as more resources
are allocated to them because more resources improve a product’s quality and thus its
market value. In particular, if the firm splits resources evenly across two products, then
each good product’s market value is v1 > 0. If the firm allocates all resources to a single
good product, then this product’s market value is v2 > v1. The above mathematical
expressions imply that resources create value when they are allocated to products with
good potential, while resources are wasted when they are allocated to products of bad
market potential.
Note that if the firm realizes increasing returns, i.e., v2 > 2v1, then the choice of
product portfolio scope becomes a trivial question as it is always optimal to allocate all
resources to a single project. Therefore, in the remainder of this essay, we focus on the
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more interesting case where the marginal value of investing more resources in a product
is decreasing, i.e., 2v1 > v2. In other words, all else being equal, allocating one unit
of resources to two good products yields higher profits that allocating both units into
a single good product. This assumption is also in line with recent empirical work that
shows that firms with a broader product portfolio scope experience higher performance
(Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014).
The Compensation Scheme
As discussed in our motivating examples companies often struggle to strike a balance
between individual incentives (e.g., rewarding a specific CEDD for its performance in
the case of GSK) and shared incentives (e.g., as in Wyeth where divisions were rewarded
based on the R&D performance of the entire organization). While the former is typical
in agency relationships and requires little justification, our model also illustrates why, in
many settings, the latter might be equally important. In particular, it can be readily seen
that, if a manager’s payoff depends only on the performance of his own product, then
the manager is always better off by communicating a positive recommendation for his
product, so that he receives more resources from the firm. Thus, information becomes
unreliable, and therefore, irrelevant for the resource allocation decisions of the firm.
However, once shared-incentives are included in the compensation scheme, a manager
who observes a bad signal, and anticipates that his product is likely to fail, becomes
more likely to “step aside” and allow his peer’s product to receive more resources.
In line with prior literature on shared-incentives (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994;
Siemsen et al., 2007; Friebel and Raith, 2010), we focus on compensation schemes of
the following structure: wˆi = k0 + ksνi + kpνj, where k0 is a fixed wage, ks is the self-
product sensitivity that determines the manager’s share from the performance of his own
product, and kp is the respective peer-product sensitivity.
5 Our compensation scheme is
mathematically equivalent to wˆi = k0 + (ks − kp)νi + kp(νi + νj). Intuitively, (ks − kp)
determines the share that each manager receives from his own product’s value, and kp
determines the share that the managers receive from the firm’s overall performance.
Consistent with the aforementioned papers, we restrict attention to linear compensation
contracts that are symmetric between the two agents.
5Where appropriate, we use the notation xˆ to denote a random variable, and distinguish it from its
expected value which, for notational convenience, we denote by x.
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We employ a linear compensation scheme for three reasons. First, under fairly gen-
eral conditions, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) have shown that optimal compensation
schemes are linear in the aggregated outcome when agents influence outcomes through
a series of actions. Based on this fundamental result, linear compensation schemes have
become pervasive in the academic literature when studying, e.g., incentive design (Siem-
sen et al., 2007), relative performance evaluation (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), optimal
organizational forms (Friebel and Raith, 2010), or sales force management (Caldieraro
and Coughlan, 2009). Second, contract linearity allows us to derive analytical results in
a complex setting that combines ex-ante moral-hazard with ex-post adverse-selection,
and facilitates the required mathematical exposition. Lastly, linear schemes are intuitive
and easily implementable, and thus, widely found in practice. For example, at Wyeth
employees received shares of an overall bonus pool.
Our focus on symmetric contracts is based on the theory of equity (Adams, 1963).
In the words of Akerlof and Yellen (1988, p.45): “All textbooks consider it self-evident
that the most important aspect of a compensation system is its accordance with workers’
conceptions of equity”. A more detailed discussion about the numerous studies that
provide support for this theory can be found in Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In our setting, given that managers
are ex-ante identical, an asymmetric contract would be hard to put in place without the
firm suffering severe repercussions from the managers’ sense of unfairness. As such, in
the remainder of our analysis we assume a symmetric contract structure. It is worth
noting though, that our characterization of the optimal product evaluation strategy
holds for asymmetric contract structures as well (the analysis is available upon request
from the authors).
Given the compensation wˆi, manager i’s utility Uˆi is comprised of wˆi net his effort
cost, i.e., Uˆi = wˆi− cI{ei=h}, where I{A} is the indicator function of event A. Following a
typical assumption in the principal-agent literature, we assume that the managers have
limited liability, i.e., wˆi ≥ 0. We also assume that the managers are risk-neutral. As
a result, the fixed term k0 only raises wages without inducing effort, so it is always
optimal for the firm to set k0 = 0. Thus, the optimal compensation scheme is uniquely
defined by the tuple k = (ks, kp). Finally the firm’s profit is the sum of the market
value of all of its products minus the agents’ compensation, which can be written as
Πˆ(k) = (1 − ks − kp)(νi + νj). For ease of exposition, we refer to manager i’s expected
wage and utility, and the firm’s expected profit by wi, Ui, and Π, respectively, where the
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expectation is taken over the products’ market potential, θ.
2.4 Analysis
In this section we characterize the firm’s optimal product evaluation and resource al-
location strategy. To ensure that the derived equilibrium solution is subgame perfect,
we solve our model by backwards induction. Therefore, we first determine the firm’s
optimal resource allocation policy for any given outcome of the product evaluation stage
(section 2.4.1). Then, we characterize the optimal product evaluation strategy (section
2.4.2) given that the firm acts rationally (i.e., maximizes profits) in the resource alloca-
tion stage. In doing so, we also derive the optimal contract structure for each type of
product evaluation strategy, and thus, account for the information rents that the firm
incurs for each strategy.
2.4.1. The Optimal Resource Allocation Strategy
Once the firm receives the recommendations of the two managers, it decides on how
much resources to allocate to each product. Clearly, a manager’s recommendation is
useful to the firm only if the manager reports truthfully his signal, and additionally, he
exerted a high-effort product evaluation. When the managers do not report truthfully
their signals, their recommendations are not informative to the firm. Consequently, the
firm allocates the resources based on its prior beliefs, which implies that resources should
be split evenly across products. When the managers report truthfully their signals, the
firm needs to consider three different cases for the evaluation stage: (i) both managers
exert low effort, e = (l, l); (ii) manager i exerts high effort, while manager j exerts
low effort, e = (h, l); and (iii) both managers exert high effort, e = (h, h).6 Then, an
optimal resource allocation strategy maps the managers’ product evaluation strategy
e = (ei, ej) together with the received recommendations m = (mi,mj) into the resource
allocation strategy that maximizes expected profits. Note that, as we show in the next
section, through the design of an appropriate contract, the firm can always anticipate
the evaluation strategy of its managers and whether or not they report truthfully their
6Throughout, we adopt the convention that in case of asymmetric effort levels, manager i always exerts
high effort, while manager j exerts low effort.
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signals. Lemma 2.1 fully characterizes the firm’s optimal resource allocation for any
possible state of e and m. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1. Define qa ≡ v1/2(v2− v1), qb ≡ (3v1− v2)/2v1, and note that v1/v2 < qb <
qa. Then, for a given evaluation strategy e, a signal fidelity q, and received recommenda-
tions m, the firm’s optimal resource allocation is summarized in Table 2.1, where “—”
indicates that the result holds for any possible realization of the respective parameter.
Table 2.1.: Optimal resource allocation.
Evaluation Efforts Signal fidelity Received recommendations Optimal resource
e = (ei, ej) q m = (mi,mj) allocation
(l, l) — — split evenly
(h, l)
q < qb — split evenly
qb ≤ q < qa (g,−) split evenly(b,−) all to product j
qa ≤ q (g,−) all to product i(b,−) all to product j
(h, h)
q ≤ v1/v2 — split evenly
q > v1/v2




Lemma 2.1 presents some intuitive properties of the firm’s optimal resource alloca-
tion strategy. First, when both managers exert low effort, the firm does not receive any
useful information, so it decides to split resources evenly across the two products. In
the case where only manager i pursues high-effort evaluation for his product, then the
firm will only direct all of its resource to the most promising product, if the information
fidelity is high enough. Otherwise, if q < qa (q < qb), then the good (bad) signal for
product i is discarded, and resources are still split evenly. The last case also highlights
the substitution effect between the two products: even if there is no high-effort recom-
mendation for the product at hand (in this case product j), it might still be optimal to
invest all resources into it as long as there is reliable information that product i is of low
market potential. Lastly, when both managers exert high effort, the optimal resource
allocation depends on both managers’ recommendations. If the two managers give iden-
tical recommendations for the products, then, again, an equal split of the resources is
the preferable choice. If, on the other hand, the recommendations are different, then all
resources should be directed to the most promising product.
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2.4.2. The Optimal Product Evaluation Strategy
Given the firm’s optimal resource allocation strategy, we are now ready to derive the
firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We
begin by establishing the first-best benchmark under the assumption that the product
managers and the firm are integrated as a single entity. This allows us to illustrate the
key properties of the optimal product evaluation strategy based on the firm’s operating
environment, namely, the information fidelity, q, and the information acquisition cost, c
(Proposition 2.1). Then, we study how a decentralized firm can induce different product
evaluation strategies by designing appropriate incentive structures (Propositions 2.2 and
2.3), and subsequently, we derive the optimal product evaluation strategy of a decen-
tralized firm (Proposition 2.4).
The Integrated Firm
The integrated firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy solves
e∗fb = arg max
e
Πfb(e),
where Πfb(e) = Eθ[νi + νj|e] − c(I{ei=h} + I{ej=h}) denotes the firm’s ex-ante expected
profit under the evaluation strategy e.
Proposition 2.1. Let qc ≡ (3v1− v2)/v2, and define ζ1 ≡ 14(qv2− v1), ζ2 ≡ 14(2v1− v2),
and ζ3 ≡ 2ζ1−ζ2. The integrated firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy is as follows:
(i) If q < qc, then, e
∗
fb = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ1; and e∗fb = (l, l) elsewhere.
(ii) If q ≥ qc, then, e∗fb = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ2; e∗fb = (h, l) for ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3; and
e∗fb = (l, l) elsewhere.
Figure 2.2 visualizes the results of Proposition 2.1 and illustrates the key properties
of the first-best evaluation strategy. Firstly, as we would intuitively expect, high-effort
evaluation is undertaken only when the information fidelity is sufficiently high, q >
v1
v2
, and the evaluation cost sufficiently low, c ≤ max{ζ1, ζ3}. Otherwise, the value of
information does not justify its cost, and the firm decides to forgo the rather inefficient
evaluation process. Remarkably, even if evaluation costs are zero, the firm never exerts
high-effort product evaluation if q ≤ v1
v2
. In this case, effort is meaningless because the
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Notes: The firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy is (i) e∗fb = (h, h) in the light gray
region; (ii) e∗fb = (h, l) in the dark gray region; and (iii) e
∗
fb = (l, l) in the white area.
information fidelity is so low that product evaluation cannot reliably identify a product’s
market potential.
Secondly, for moderate q values (v1
v2
< q < qc), the firm adopts a rather coarse
evaluation strategy by either exerting high effort for both products or none. However,
for higher q values (q ≥ qc) and moderate costs c (ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3), the firm finds it optimal
to pursue high-effort evaluation for only one of its products. In fact, even if the firm can
obtain perfect information, i.e., q approaches 1, it still remains optimal to pursue only
low-effort evaluation for the second product. Moreover, if a product’s market value is
relatively insensitive to the allocated resources, i.e., v2 <
3
2
v1, then the asymmetric effort
strategy, e = (h, l), is never optimal (i.e., qc > 1). On the contrary, if the market value
is very sensitive to the invested resources (v2 approaches 2v1), then pursuing high-effort





In this section, we account for the decentralized nature of modern NPD projects, and
the potential misalignment of incentives that stem from it. As such, to elicit the neces-
sary information the firm needs to design appropriate incentive schemes. As discussed
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earlier, managers can pursue three different evaluation strategies, and to induce each
one of them, the firm needs to offer a different incentive scheme. Thus, to derive the
firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy we first need to account for the managers’
information rents that vary across these contracts.
Throughout our analysis, we focus on truth-inducing contracts. Intuitively, non-
truth-inducing contracts provide no value to the firm, and therefore, the firm would
never reward a manager for providing useless information, i.e., ks = kp = 0 for any
non-truth-inducing contract. Moreover, the next Lemma states that a contract that
incentivizes only one product manager to exert high-effort evaluation can never be in-
centive compatible. Intuitively, given ex-ante identical managers, if the contract terms
are such that one of the managers decides to exert high-effort, so does the other.
Lemma 2.2. No feasible truth-inducing symmetric compensation scheme exists such
that, in equilibrium, managers choose different effort levels during product evaluation.
By Lemma 2.2, to find the firm’s optimal product evaluation strategy, we only
need to investigate the firm’s optimal contract that induces truth-telling and high effort
by either both managers or neither. Consider first the simpler case where the firm
incentivizes both managers to pursue a low-effort evaluation strategy. In that case, the
optimal contract is ks = kp = 0. This contract is clearly incentive compatible in effort
because no manager has an incentive to exert high effort, since then he would incur
a cost without receiving any reward. In short, the firm can induce low-effort product
evaluation by simply offering no reward to its managers, and in that case, the firm
optimally splits resources evenly across products (since v2 < 2v1) to obtain an expected
profit Π(k = (0, 0)) = v1.
We now examine the more interesting case where the firm incentivizes both man-
agers to exert high-effort evaluation and to truthfully report their signals. In that case,
the firm’s objective is to maximize the expected value of both products net the man-
agers’ wages. More formally, the firm solves the following optimization problem (the
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exact derivation can be found in the proof of Proposition 2.2):
max
ks,kp
Π(k) = (1− ks − kp)1
2
(qv2 + v1) (2.1)
s.t. ksqv2 + kpqv1 ≥ kpqv2 + kp(1− q)v1 (IC-g)
kpqv2 + kp(1− q)v1 ≥ ks(1− q)v2 + kpqv1 (IC-b)
2ksqv2 − 8c ≥ ksv2 (IC-e)
ks, kp ≥ 0. (LL)
Constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b) ensure that both managers truthfully reveal a good and
a bad signal, respectively. High-effort product evaluation is incentivized by (IC-e), and
the limited liability constraint (LL) guarantees that wages are non-negative. Since high
effort is costly for the managers, the firm has to pay a strictly positive wage to induce
truth-telling and high effort. Thus, (LL) never binds in optimum. In contrast, (IC-e)
is always binding because the firm pays just as much as necessary to induce high-effort
evaluation. Furthermore, it is harder to motivate a manager to reveal a bad than a good
signal. Hence, truthful revelation of bad signals (IC-b) also binds at optimality. Figure
2.3 graphically illustrates the optimization problem and Proposition 2.2 characterizes
the optimal contract, k?.
Proposition 2.2. The optimal contract that induces truth-telling and high-effort product









< 1 and the ratio decreases in q and v2, while it is invariant in c.
The optimal contract exhibits several interesting properties. First, with simple
algebraic manipulation it can be readily seen that both k?s and k
?
p decrease in q. In other
words, managers who can acquire better information receive a smaller share of each
product’s value. This counter-intuitive finding can be explained by recalling that the
optimal contract is determined by the intersection of constraints (IC-e) and (IC-b) (see
Figure 2.3), which ensure high-effort product evaluation ex-ante and truthful revelation
of bad signals ex-post, respectively. Consider k?s which is determined solely by constraint
(IC-e). From (IC-e) we see that as the fidelity, q, increases, all else being equal, exerting
high effort becomes more rewarding for the manager than exerting low effort. This
happens because the only reason for the manager to exert high effort is so that he can
credibly indicate the product’s high potential to the firm, and therefore, request more
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Notes: The light gray region indicates the set of all feasible contracts that induce truth-telling
and high effort. The optimal contract (k?s , k
?
p) is at the intersection of (IC-b) and (IC-e).
resources for it. Clearly, the credibility of the manager’s recommendations, and thus,
his incentive to exert high effort in the first place increase as the information fidelity
increases. As such, higher information fidelity makes higher effort more rewarding for
the manager. At the same time, the firm realizes that it can now lower the manager’s
share of his project value, k?s , while still ensuring that his effort incentive constraint
(IC-e) is satisfied. That is why k?s decreases in q.
To see why k?p decreases in q, recall that the reason why a manager with a bad signal
might report a good signal is that he can request more resources for his project. These
resources, however, are only beneficial to the manager if his project eventually succeeds
in the market. As the information fidelity increases, and given that the manager has
observed a bad signal, the likelihood that his project will “defy the odds”, and turn into
a success, is shrinking. As a result, lying to the firm becomes less rewarding, and all else
being equal, the firm can incentivize truth-telling with a lower k?p. In fact, if q = 1, then
k?p = 0 (but k
?
s > 0), i.e., the firm completely abandons shared incentives if managers
can acquire perfect information. Intuitively, managers always truthfully report their
signals, as there is no value in claiming resources for a project that is bound to fail. It is
worth noting the stark contrast regarding the effect of a noisier environment on the pay-
performance sensitivities (i.e., k?s and k
?
p) between our model and the standard theory
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on principal-agent models. For instance, Holmstrom (1979) shows that pay-performance
sensitivity increases as the effort has more influence on the final outcome, i.e., as the
environment becomes less noisy. This comparison highlights the fundamentally different
nature of incentives that induce higher effort for information acquisition versus standard
moral-hazard settings where an agent’s effort stochastically improves the outcome of the
project.
Second, both k?s and k
?
p decrease as v2 increases, i.e., when allocating all the resources
to a single project becomes more rewarding. The former happens because a higher v2
makes exerting effort more rewarding for the manager: if his project receives the entire
resource budget, its market value will be much higher, and so will his share of that value.
The latter happens because a higher v2 makes the manager more willing to disclose a
bad signal truthfully: if his peer’s product succeeds, he will also receive a share from





to incentivize the managers to exert high-effort and report truthfully. Interestingly, k?s
is invariant in v1 while k
?
p increases in v1. A higher v1 erodes the value from ex-post
“winner-picking”, and therefore, it has the exact opposite effect of v2 when it comes to
incentivizing truth-telling. It has no effect, however, when it comes to incentivizing high
effort ex-ante, as due to symmetry the manager might still receive v1 in either case (i.e.,
under high or low effort).
Third, the ratio between k?p and k
?
s decreases in both q and v2, but it is invariant in




truth-telling. To see why the cost c does not affect a manager’s truth-telling propensity,
note that each manager decides on his recommendation after incurring the effort cost.
Hence, effort costs are sunk costs and do not affect a manager’s recommendation. To see
why k?p is decreasing more steeply in q than k
?
s , note that information of higher fidelity
is always more crucial ex-post (i.e., when a bad signal has actually been realized) than
ex-ante (i.e., when either a good or a bad signal can be realized). In other words,
when choosing his effort level, a manager does not yet know whether a high evaluation
fidelity raises or reduces the expected value of his product. Due to this ambiguity, k?s
is only moderately decreasing in q. In contrast, when the manager decides whether to
truthfully report his bad signal, q has a direct detrimental effect on the value of his
project. Therefore, k?p is more sensitive to the manager’s information fidelity.
This result bears important managerial implications for the optimal balance between
individual and shared incentives. It states that in environments of higher information
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fidelity (high q) or where “winner-picking” is more crucial (high v2), the firm needs
to shift its focus towards rewarding based on the performance of individual project
units rather than on company-wide metrics. So far, our discussion was focused on the
pay-performance sensitivities k?s and k
?





decrease in q and increase in c, the total utility of a manager might increase in the fidelity
of his information and decrease in his effort costs. Rather surprisingly, Proposition 2.3
shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 2.3. A manager’s expected utility Ui(k
?) decreases in q and v2, and in-
creases in c; while the firm’s expected profit Π(k?) increases in q and v2, and decreases
in c.
Proposition 2.3 states a counter-intuitive result: a manager’s utility decreases in
the information fidelity of the evaluation process, that is, when the manager can provide
better information to the firm. Similarly, when this information becomes more important
(i.e., v2 increases), the manager’s utility decreases as well. Thus, even though a higher





steep that it leaves each manager with a lower expected utility. On the contrary, a
manager’s utility increases in c as both k?s and k
?
p increase in c. This can be explained
as follows. Recall from our discussion following Proposition 2 that both a higher q
and higher v2 reduce the misalignment in incentives between the managers and the
firm. As such, they make the manager more willing to exert high effort and also to
disclose his signals truthfully. Conversely, a higher c makes high effort more costly for
the manager, and widens the incentive misalignment with the firm. A lower (higher)
misalignment in incentives, in turn, results in lower (higher) information rents for the
manager, and consequently, to higher (lower) profits for the firm. Having characterized
the optimal contract structure, we can now derive the optimal evaluation strategy for
the decentralized firm.
Proposition 2.4. Define ζ4 ≡ ζ1 · 2qv2−v22qv2+2v1 ·
qv2−(2q−1)v1
v2−(2q−1)v1 . The decentralized firm’s optimal
product evaluation strategy is to incentivize both managers to exert (i) high effort if
c ≤ ζ4; and (ii) low effort if c > ζ4. Moreover, ζ4 < ζ1 and there exist parameter values
such that ζ4 > ζ2.
As we would intuitively expect, the presence of information asymmetry between the
managers and the firm makes the process of product evaluation “more expensive” to the
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firm. As a result, the area for which product evaluation is undertaken shrinks. This is
clearly illustrated in Figure 2.4 which plots the optimal evaluation strategy under decen-
tralization vis-a`-vis the optimal policy of the integrated firm (dashed line): In the region
ABFEC a decentralized firm does not undertake any high-effort product evaluation but
an integrated firm does. Mathematically, this corresponds to ζ4 < max{ζ1, ζ3}.
Interestingly, however, this result does not imply that the decentralized firm always
undertakes less evaluation effort compared to the integrated one. On the contrary, when
ζ4 > ζ2 (region CED in Figure 2.4), the decentralized firm undertakes more evaluation
effort by exerting high-effort evaluation for both products whereas an integrated firm
exerts high-effort evaluation for only one of them. In other words, the decentralized firm
is actually over-investing in information acquisition compared to the first-best policy.
This over-investment in information is caused by the firm’s inability to observe neither
the managers’ efforts nor the outcomes of their evaluation. In addition, as discussed in
Lemma 2.2, the firm cannot offer a truth-inducing contract that incentivizes a high-effort
evaluation for one product and a low-effort evaluation for the other one. Consequently,
either manager can claim that he exerted high-effort evaluation, and therefore, request
resources for his project.















Notes: The firm’s optimal contract induces (i) e∗ = (h, h) in the light gray region; and (ii)
e∗ = (l, l) in the white area.
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2.5 The Effect of Decentralization on the
Firm’s Product Portfolio Scope and
Welfare Implications
So far, we have discussed the effect of decentralization on the firm’s optimal product
evaluation strategy. This evaluation strategy, in turn, determines the information that
the firm has available when making its resource allocation decisions, and therefore,
the firm’s product portfolio scope. While the extant literature in NPD has studied
extensively the information acquisition process for a single project (e.g., Thomke, 2007,
and references therein) and the resource allocation decisions for the product portfolio
(e.g., Kavadias and Chao 2007, and references therein), the effect of the former on the
latter has been rather overlooked. In this section, we begin by investigating how changes
in the firm’s evaluation strategy affect its product portfolio scope. We then examine the
firm’s profits and the social welfare, and identify the conditions where decentralization
leads to greater or lesser profit and welfare losses.
2.5.1. Product Portfolio Scope
Before discussing the effect of decentralization on the firm’s product portfolio scope, it
is instructive to clarify the relationship between the product evaluation strategy and the
product portfolio scope for the integrated firm. From Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.1,
we have the following direct observations: (i) when the firm pursues low-effort evaluation
for both products, it always ends up splitting resources evenly across products, and thus,
developing both products; (ii) when the firm pursues high-effort evaluation for only one
of the products, and the information is relatively reliable, then the firm always develops a
single product; (iii) when the firm pursues high-effort evaluation for both of its products,
then it is equally likely that the firm develops one or two products.
In other words, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the extent of product
evaluation and the number of products that the firm develops: a firm with little infor-
mation spreads its risks across both products to increase the chance that at least one
product is successful, a partially informed firm makes a crude decision by developing
only one, while a fully informed firm might choose either allocation strategy depend-
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ing on its refined information. This non-monotonic effect is illustrated in Figure 2.5
which plots the integrated firm’s expected product development scope for all possible
cases (dashed line). Proposition 2.5 sheds light on how decentralization affects the firm’s
product portfolio scope.
Proposition 2.5. Let nfb and n be the expected number of products developed by the
integrated and decentralized firm, respectively. Then, for any given q and c, decentral-
ization weakly increases a firm’s expected product portfolio scope, i.e., n ≥ nfb.
Proposition 2.5 highlights that decentralization leads a firm to broaden its product
portfolio scope compared to an integrated firm. Recall from Proposition 4 that in some
regions, decentralization results in under-investment in information (region ABFEC in
Figure 2.4), while in others it results in over-investment (region CED in Figure 2.4).
In either case, decentralization impedes an asymmetric high-effort evaluation strategy,
which corresponds to launching a single product on the market. Instead, the decen-
tralized firm has to choose between spreading its bets across products under limited
information versus a more refined, but overly costly, product portfolio allocation. Our
result regarding the role of decentralization on the firm’s product portfolio scope is also
consistent with Thomas (2011) who shows that the observed product range of multina-
tional firms exceeds the optimal firm-level response to differences in consumer preferences
and the retail environment.7
2.5.2. Profit and Welfare Loss
To measure the efficiency of the firm’s contract scheme, we employ two different perfor-
mance indicators: the firm’s percentage profit loss, which captures the effect of decen-
tralization on the firm’s profits, ηp ≡ 1− Π(e?)Πfb(efb) , and the percentage welfare loss, which






two performance measures quantify the implications of decentralization on two different
levels of aggregation. While ηp captures the effect on the firm’s level, ηw measures the
contract’s social efficiency for the entire system (firm and managers).
7The recent work of Alonso et al. (2008), and Rantakari (2008) also discusses how decentralization
might lead to inefficiencies in an organization’s decision making processes. Their work, however, is
not concerned with product evaluation and resource allocation decisions, but rather with the tradeoff
of coordination (across the divisions) versus adaptation (to the local market conditions).
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Notes: The firm’s expected product development scope under decentralization (solid line) and
integration (dashed line) for q < qc (left), q ≥ qc and ζ4 < ζ2 (middle), and q ≥ qc and ζ4 ≥ ζ2
(right), respectively.
Proposition 2.6. If the integrated and the decentralized firm both pursue a low-effort
product evaluation strategy for the two products, then ηp = 0. If the decentralized firm
under-invests in product evaluation, then the percentage profit loss increases in q and v2,
and decreases in c. In any other case, the percentage profit loss decreases in q and v2,
and increases in c.
According to Proposition 2.6, the effect of decentralization varies significantly across
the different regions depicted in Figure 2.4. Recall from Figure 2.4 that if the cost of
information acquisition is very high (c > max{ζ1, ζ3}), then both the integrated and
decentralized firm do not exert any high-effort product evaluation, and therefore, the
decentralized firm does not need to incentivize its managers. As such, the decentralized
firm is able to accrue all the profits (ηp = 0). When the decentralized firm under-invests
in product evaluation (region ABFEC in Figure 2.4), then ηp increases in q and v2, and
decreases in c. Intuitively, as the decentralized firm under-invests in product evaluation,
a higher q implies that more valuable information is lost, and therefore the profit loss
becomes steeper. Obviously, this effect is even more severe as v2 increases, and the value
of ex-post winner-picking is higher. Lastly, when the firm induces high-effort product
evaluation (region under ACE) for both products, ηp decreases in q and v2, and increases
in c. As discussed in Proposition 2.3, in that region a higher q or v2 reduce the incentive
misalignment between the managers and the firm, while a higher c widens it. The former
effect reduces the firm’s profit losses, whereas the latter increases it.
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Proposition 2.7. If the decentralized firm pursues the same product evaluation strategy
as the integrated firm, then there is no welfare loss under decentralization, ηw = 0.
Otherwise, if the decentralized firm under-(over-)invests in product evaluation, then the
percentage welfare loss increases (decreases) in q and v2, and decreases (increases) in c.
According to Proposition 2.7, if decentralization does not affect the firm’s optimal
evaluation strategy, then there is no welfare loss; the total generated value remains intact
and it is only the distribution of profits between the firm and the managers that changes.
As discussed in Figure 2.4, this happens either when the information fidelity is very high
and the evaluation cost very low, or at the other extreme, when the information fidelity
is very low and the evaluation cost very high. In the former case, information acquisition
is so effective that both firms always evaluate both products, while in the latter, it is so
ineffective that both firms always choose to forgo costly product evaluation. In reality,
most firms face environments where valuable information is also costly. Importantly,
in these regions, decentralization interferes with the firm’s optimal evaluation strategy,
and leads to a welfare loss.
Similar to the percentage profit loss, the effects of the evaluation fidelity and cost on
the percentage welfare loss, ηw, vary significantly across the regions. If the decentralized
firm collects less information than is socially optimal, i.e., under-invests in product
evaluation, then the welfare loss is most severe when the fidelity of information is high
and the evaluation costs are low. In contrast, if the decentralized firm gathers more
information than an integrated firm, i.e., the firm over-invests in product evaluation,
then the social value of this additional information gain increases as the information
fidelity becomes higher and the evaluation costs lower.
2.6 Conclusions
This essay aims at understanding a key concern of many senior R&D executives: “how
do you make good decisions when the information you need to make those decisions
comes largely from the project champions who are competing against one another for
resources” (Sharpe and Keelin, 1998, p.45). Prior academic literature has extensively
discussed the importance of such a question when managing parallel projects (e.g., Loch
et al., 2006), but without offering explicit guidance on how to structure appropriate
incentive mechanisms that address these challenges. This is also highlighted in Lerner
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(2012, p. 170) who emphasizes that “one crucial, though often neglected, point is that
such tolerance for failure requires a rethinking not just of compensation schemes, but
also of how projects are selected and funded. [. . . ] A question that would reward both
further research by economic theorists and real-world exploration is how to induce ’truth-
telling’ when evaluating high-risk innovative projects”. The main contribution of this
essay is to offer a formal framework on the tradeoffs involved between incentivizing
information acquisition and truthful revelation among new product development teams.
More specifically, our study makes three contributions in the literature.
First, we show that by offering a combination of individual and shared incentives,
the firm can incentivize managers to undertake high evaluation efforts and at the same
time disclose truthfully their findings. In doing so, we disentangle the role of each
incentive type: individual incentives give the manager the potential to request more
resources for his project if he receives a good signal of high fidelity. On the other hand,
shared incentives induce the manager who receives a bad signal to “step aside” and let
his peer receive his resources as the latter might have better chances on the market.
We then show that a higher information fidelity or a lower information acquisition cost
lead to lower pay-performance sensitivity for both the individual and shared incentives.
Intuitively, both parameters make the acquisition and disclosure of information lead to
a better alignment between the managers’ and the firm’s interests, thereby reducing
the managers’ information rents. At the same time, our analysis highlights that in
environments with lower evaluation fidelity the firm should shift the balance towards
emphasizing shared rather than individual incentives. This is so because any change in
the fidelity of information is always more impactful ex-post (i.e., when a bad signal has
already been realized) rather than ex-ante (i.e., when either good or bad information is
likely to appear).
Second, our analysis reveals how decentralization impedes the implementation of an
optimal product evaluation strategy, specifically in environments where valuable infor-
mation is costly. In particular, decentralization might lead a firm to either under-invest
or over-invest in product evaluation. Importantly, this has implications for the firm’s
product portfolio scope: a decentralized firm spreads its resources into a portfolio at
least as broad, and for most parameters strictly broader, than that of an integrated
firm. What is noteworthy here is that both under- and over-investment in product
evaluation have the same effect on the firm’s product portfolio scope. This happens
because in the former case the high uncertainty forces the firm to spread its bets among
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multiple projects while in the latter case the firm develops more products as a response
to more information which nonetheless comes at an overly high cost. Lastly, our work
shows that distinguishing between the regions where decentralization leads to under-
investment versus over-investment in product evaluation has crucial implications for the
firm’s profit loss and the total welfare loss. In the over-investment region, the losses
decrease in the information fidelity while they increase in the information cost. Intu-
itively, over-spending in information becomes less detrimental when this information is
valuable, but becomes more detrimental when this information is expensive. The exact
opposite effects take place in the under-investment region.
In order to maintain tractability and develop a parsimonious model, we have made
some assumptions regarding the role of product managers, and correspondingly, the spe-
cific functional forms of the incentive structure. Specifically, our essay focuses on the
project selection stage of NPD, and as such, on the evaluation rather than the gener-
ation of different alternatives (e.g., higher effort in our setting improves the selection
process but not the quality of the different alternatives). Recent work has offered im-
portant insights on the structure of the opportunity spaces (Kornish and Ulrich, 2011)
as well as on the effect of decentralization on the search process itself (Mihm et al.,
2010). Moreover, our analysis considers ex-ante symmetric projects. In practice, firms
are often faced with projects that vary significantly with respect to their state of exe-
cution, uncertainty, and need for resources. While our model captures some first-order
effects regarding the interplay between information acquisition and resource allocation,
we believe that capturing tradeoffs among projects that evolve over time is a fruitful
avenue for future research.
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Seasonal Products: Scale and
Timing of Inventory Availability
with Moritz Fleischmann1
3.1 Introduction
In the last decades, the classical newsvendor model has received widespread attention
as the most prominent decision support tool in stochastic inventory theory. The cen-
tral question that it strives to answer is (Porteus, 2002): For a seasonal product, how
much inventory should a firm stock to best satisfy uncertain customer demand over
the product’s limited selling season? This problem is pertinent for many products in
diverse industries, and by applying the newsvendor model scholars provide manifold
recommendations on how to successfully manage these products (for a good overview,
see Cachon and Ko¨k, 2007). Yet, despite its popularity as decision support tool, the
classical newsvendor model also possesses essential limitations that impede a wider ap-
plicability to more general market environments. Specifically, as a major drawback, the
model does not take into account how the specific properties of a product’s selling season
interact with a firm’s inventory strategy. Importantly, it is an open question how firms
should manage products with an uncertain demand timing. Such uncertain customer
demand patterns, however, are frequently observed in practice. Cawthorn (1998, p. 20)
vividly captures this phenomenon with the following quote about customer behavior in
the food industry: “It is not the threat of snow but the sight of snow that sends mothers
running to the market for hot chocolate.” Most importantly, external influences, such as
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Selling over an Uncertain Season:
Scale and Timing of Inventory Availability”, coauthored with Moritz Fleischmann.
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weather conditions, trends, or the diffusion of diseases, do not only affect the magnitude
of customer demand, but also the timing of a product’s actual selling season. In fact,
this latter effect of shifting demand earlier or later is often considered the primary effect
(Chen and Yano, 2010). Thus, in markets with uncertain customer demand patterns,
a fundamental challenge for each firm is not only to determine how much inventory to
stock, but also to decide when to make the product available for sale. This is the primary
issue that we address in this paper.
This question is particularly relevant in industries where selling seasons are highly
erratic and mistiming costs are substantial. Consider, for example, the market for lawn
and garden items. Firms offering high-value garden items, such as lawn tractors, face
a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, these firms operate in a high cost, capital-
intensive environment because production is expensive and storage costs are significant.
On the other hand, customer demand for these products shows a strong seasonality and
a high dependence on temperature and weather patterns. One year a season breaks
late due to an extraordinary cold winter, while in the next year a heat wave in early
spring causes demand to take off early. In such an uncertain market environment,
vendors of lawn tractors have to take two crucial decisions: how many tractors to stock,
and equally importantly, when to make the tractors available for sale? Too early, and
high opportunity and storage costs substantially erode profits. Too late, and customer
demand has already gone.
Other examples for products with similar characteristics are sprinkled throughout
the academic literature. With a focus on retailing, Starr-McCluer (2000) and Chen
and Yano (2010) provide a nice overview on products that exhibit a seasonal pattern
that changes from one year to another. In retailing, shelf space is expensive and offering
products at the wrong time can dramatically devour revenues. Allen and Schuster (2004)
identify similar tradeoffs during the harvest of crops. While the crops’ maturation dates
are extremely sensitive to weather and soil conditions, decision-makers have to decide
upfront on the harvesting times and the required investment in equipment. Since this
simultaneous inventory scaling and timing problem has been detected in many industries,
specialized software and consulting firms such as Revionics already offer decision support
tools for products with volatile demand patterns (Moore, 2010). Surprisingly, however,
academic research provides only very limited guidance on how to effectively manage the
involved tradeoffs.
The purpose of this paper is to understand how a firm should design its inventory
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strategy to successfully manage the complex interplay between the two different sources
of uncertainty: uncertainty in demand scale, and uncertainty in demand timing. Specif-
ically, we answer the following question: For a seasonal product, when and how much
inventory should a firm stock to best satisfy uncertain customer demand over an uncer-
tain selling season? For a firm operating in such a volatile market environment, the key
to successful inventory management is understanding the involved tradeoffs and their
mutual interdependency. To explore these tradeoffs, we build a theoretical model that
accommodates both forms of demand uncertainty, while allowing the firm to decide on
its inventory scale and timing. This framework enables us to clearly elicit how a firm
should manage the different sources of uncertainty.
Our study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, we show that
the introduction of stochasticity in the product’s selling season exposes the firm to a
novel tradeoff that has to be managed with a careful inventory timing. Specifically,
besides the classical newsvendor tradeoff, the firm also has to balance the product’s
market potential with the product’s time on the market. We find that this challenge
induces the firm to reduce its inventory scale and to shorten the product’s availability
period, respectively. Our results also shed light on the subtle interaction between the
firm’s scale and timing decision. Interestingly, we show that the firm may choose to build
higher inventories when the product’s market potential decreases. The reason behind
this counter-intuitive finding is that the firm can reduce inventory costs by shortening
the product’s selling period. A shorter season, in turn, is cheaper to serve, thereby
enticing the firm to increase inventories. We highlight that this non-monotonic relation
also influences how the firm reacts to changes in the cost structures. Intriguingly, in
contrast to the classical newsvendor literature, the firm may increase its inventories
when operational costs increase.
Second, we find that the uncertainty in demand timing has more severe repercussions
on the firm’s optimal inventory strategy than the uncertainty in demand scale. From
the classical newsvendor literature, we know that an adequately chosen inventory scale
enables the firm to effectively manage the risk stemming from the uncertainty in the
customer demand scale. Surprisingly, however, managing the timing risk is much more
complex. We find that when the timing uncertainty is too severe, the firm’s flexibility
to adjust the product’s availability period may not be sufficient to prevent the firm from
exiting the market. This result is driven by the firm’s inability to reduce the product’s
inventory costs without affecting the product’s market potential. By shortening the
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product’s availability period, the firm reduces the inventory costs, but also sacrifices
some of the product’s market potential. These countervailing forces, which are not
present in classical newsvendor contexts, are the reason why a firm needs to thoroughly
design its inventory strategy to successfully manage products with an uncertain selling
season.
Third, we provide a parsimonious and analytically tractable mechanism to explicitly
integrate inventory holding costs and mistiming costs into a general newsvendor frame-
work. This helps us to discover the links between the different cost components and the
firm’s inventory strategy. Importantly, we find that the presence of inventory holding
costs and earliness costs simultaneously affects the firm’s overage costs, underage costs,
and mistiming costs. This happens because all of these costs are directly influenced by
the firm’s inventory scaling and timing decisions. Moreover, this result questions the
common approach in the classical newsvendor literature to attribute inventory holding
costs only to the firm’s overage costs (e.g., Kouvelis and Gutierrez, 1997). Instead, we
show that it is important for the firm to have a more differentiated view on the effects
of inventory holding costs.
3.2 Literature Review
The goal of this paper is to understand the mutual interdependency between two central
questions that critically determine a product’s profitability: when to make a product
available for sale, and how much inventory to stock? By combining these two decisions
into an integrated framework, our work intersects with two rich streams of prior research:
(i) the literature on stochastic inventory management; and (ii) the literature on new
product introductions.
The extensive literature on stochastic inventory management centers around the
question of how much inventory to stock to best satisfy stochastic future customer de-
mand. Given the importance of this question for virtually every product, scholars provide
rich answers for many different products in many different market configurations. For
an overview of this literature see, e.g., Porteus (2002). Most closely related to our work
is the classical newsvendor literature on inventory management for seasonal products.
Stripped to its essence, the classical newsvendor model determines the optimal inventory
scale for a single product with probabilistic customer demand that is sold over a single
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deterministic selling season (Cachon and Ko¨k, 2007). To further enhance its practical
applicability, the classical newsvendor model has received considerable extensions along
one or more dimensions. These extensions focus on investigating joint inventory and
pricing decisions (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999; Raz and Porteus, 2006; Salinger and Am-
pudia, 2011), the impact of different risk attitudes (Eeckhoudt et al., 1995; Chen et al.,
2009), the repercussions of limited demand information (Perakis and Roels, 2008; Ben-
Tal et al., 2013), the value of advanced demand information and quick response strategies
(Iyer and Bergen, 1997; Milner and Kouvelis, 2005; Cachon and Swinney, 2011), and the
consequences of different financing options (Gaur and Seshadri, 2005; Kouvelis and Zhao,
2012). All these papers, albeit examining diverse market environments, are silent about
the issues arising from a stochastic selling season. However, as highlighted earlier, in
practice many firms only have limited information about their products’ selling seasons.
We contribute to the newsvendor literature by addressing the challenges resulting from
this additional timing uncertainty. Moreover, we study how to actively manage this
uncertainty by allowing the firm to choose its inventory scale and inventory timing.
To our knowledge, the only other paper that investigates joint inventory scaling
and timing decisions in a newsvendor context is U¨lku¨ et al. (2005). By analyzing a
firm’s optimal capacity investment timing when a delayed investment leads to a reduced
market potential, but also to a more accurate demand forecast, they show that the firm
may deliberately sacrifice some of its product’s market potential to elicit more precise
demand information. While we also emphasize the importance of the firm’s inventory
timing decision, our work differs from U¨lku¨ et al. (2005) in multiple significant aspects.
Most notably, in our work the firm’s primary motivation to postpone its inventory timing
is the stochasticity in the properties of the selling season. We also examine how this
uncertainty affects a product’s effective cost structures.
So far, the newsvendor literature has largely disregarded the issue of when to make
a product available for sale. Instead, this question has been extensively discussed in the
new product development area. Our work therefore also touches upon previous research
on the optimal timing of new product introductions. This literature provides mixed
evidence of whether firms should prefer an early or a late market entry (Krishnan and
Ulrich, 2001). Advocates of an early product availability assert that being early enables
a firm to maximize the product’s market potential, to minimize product development
costs, to build a strong reputation, to achieve higher profit margins, and to create a
sustainable competitive advantage (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Lilien and Yoon,
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1990; Hendricks and Singhal, 1997; Klastorin and Tsai, 2004). We follow these papers
by adopting the view that the firm’s primary motivation for early market entry is a high
market potential and that this potential decreases over time.
Previous work also identifies tradeoffs that may induce a firm to choose a late prod-
uct availability. McCardle (1985) argues that a firm should wait with its product intro-
duction in order to acquire more precise information about the product’s specific market
environment. Kalish and Lilien (1986) emphasize the tradeoff between introduction tim-
ing and product performance. By postponing the product’s availability timing, a firm
can invest more time in improving product performance. A better product, in turn, im-
proves customer value and therefore spurs customer demand (Bayus et al., 1997). Savin
and Terwiesch (2005) highlight the positive impact of a delayed product availability on
a product’s unit costs. Although deferring a product’s introduction timing offers many
potential benefits for a firm, actually realizing these benefits is extremely challenging,
especially for products with short selling seasons (Cohen et al., 1996). Specifically, a
firm may wait too long and lose the product’s entire market potential. We complement
previous research by formally analyzing how stochasticity in a product’s selling season
influences a firm’s inventory timing decision. As such, our work differs from previous
papers in multiple dimensions. Most importantly, in our setting the firm’s main con-
cern is a costly mismatch between the inventory scaling and timing decision, and the
stochastic customer demand pattern.
Recently, Ke et al. (2013) were the first to examine the effects of operational costs
on a firm’s decision of when to launch a new product generation. They identify inventory
holding costs as a major reason for postponing a product’s introduction. We support
this view, but with our model setup, we are able to identify another important factor
that influences a firm’s optimal timing strategy: mistiming costs that arise due to the
threat of a premature product availability.
3.3 The Model
Consider a firm that is faced with the challenge of determining its inventory strategy for
a seasonal product. For the firm, the inventory strategy consists of two key decisions:
the timing and scale of product availability, i.e., when to make the product available
on its target market, and how much inventory to stock? Typically, the firm has to
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take these decisions well before the product becomes available to customers as the firm
needs time, e.g., to initiate and ramp up the production, to build sufficient stocks,
and to advertise the product (see, e.g., Kurawarwala and Matsuo, 1996; Van Mieghem,
2003; U¨lku¨ et al., 2005). As such, when choosing its inventory strategy the firm has
only limited information about the future market environment and cannot perfectly
predict the product’s market potential and the timing of customer demand. Due to this
inherent uncertainty, the firm’s inventory strategy may suffer from costly mistiming and
inadequate scaling decisions. Offering the product before customers actually demand the
product evokes earliness costs, while a late inventory availability results in lost customers.
Similarly, excess inventories reduce the firm’s profitability, whereas insufficient stocks
lead to unmet demand. Ultimately, the firm seeks to maximize expected profits by
making the product available at the right time and in the right quantity.
A central and novel aspect of our model is the discrimination between a product’s
selling season and its availability period. In line with the classical newsvendor literature,
we define the product’s selling season as the time span during which customers are
willing to buy the product. To be specific, the selling season starts with the first,
and ends with the last customer demanding the product. In contrast, we define the
product’s availability period as the time during which the firm actually tries to sell the
product on the market. The availability period starts when the product is first made
available on the market, and ends either when the firm stocks out or when the selling
season closes. In order to maximize profits, the firm needs to optimally synchronize the
product’s availability period with the actual selling season by choosing and executing
a specific inventory strategy. In practice, however, this is not a trivial task because
customer behavior is not perfectly predictable. To capture this synchronization issue in
our modeling framework, we follow Kalyanaram and Krishnan (1997) and U¨lku¨ et al.
(2005) by assuming that customer demand occurs irrespective of whether or not the
product is available for sale. Thus, in contrast to the product’s availability period,
the selling season is exogenous and cannot be influenced by the firm. Importantly, we
depart from prior literature by assuming that the selling season is stochastic and that
the firm only learns about the product’s actual selling season after the firm has chosen
its inventory strategy. Due to this imperfect knowledge about the selling season, the
product’s availability period need not coincide with the selling season. We now explain
our modeling assumptions in greater detail.
The firm’s inventory strategy is represented by the pair (x, t), where x is the amount
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of inventory that the firm stocks, and t is the time when the product is first made avail-
able for sale. Throughout, we measure time τ continuously. The product’s (stochastic)
market environment, M = (Q,S), is characterized by the product’s market potential,
Q, and its selling season, S. In practice, Q and S are typically dependent on one an-
other; e.g., a short (long) selling season may come with a small (high) market potential.
We explicitly allow for such dependencies by only assuming that M follows a known
continuous multivariate distribution with strictly positive density. The product’s market
potential is the cumulative customer demand over the product’s entire selling season,
i.e., Q is the maximum number of products that the firm can sell to its customers. We
assume Q to be stochastic with support on R+. The product’s selling season determines
during which time span customers are willing to buy the product, and how customer de-
mand is distributed over this period. Mathematically, S is a collection of three stochastic
elements, S = (B,L,A(τ |Q,B,L)). The beginning of the product’s selling season is des-
ignated by the random variable B with support on [0, bu], and the season length is given
by the random variable L with support on (0, lu]. We assume that customer demand
occurs gradually over time and that each customer tries to buy the product only once at
a single point in time within the product’s selling season. This is in line with Hendricks
and Singhal (1997) who highlight that unserved customers may not be willing to wait
in case of product unavailability. To represent the customers’ dynamic buying behav-
ior, we follow U¨lku¨ et al. (2005) by defining for each realization of (Q,B,L) a function
A(τ |Q,B,L) that designates the fraction of the product’s full market potential that will
realize between time τ and the end of the selling season.2 Mathematically, our assump-
tions on customer behavior imply that A(τ |Q,B,L) satisfies: (i) A(τ |Q,B,L) = 1 for
all τ ≤ B; (ii) A(τ |Q,B,L) = 0 for all τ ≥ B + L; and (iii) A(τ |Q,B,L) decreases for
all other τ . In other words, demand is concentrated within the product’s selling sea-
son, and unserved customers are lost. To simplify the mathematical exposition, we also
assume that A(τ |Q,B,L) is once continuously differentiable in τ for any realization of
(Q,B,L), and we label the first derivative of any function z with respect to τ by z′. For
brevity, we refer to the product’s market potential at time τ by Qτ ≡ A(τ |Q,B,L)Q.
With this definition, the stochastic customer demand rate at time τ is −Q′τ . Finally,
we define dτ (Z) ≡ E
[−Q′τ1{Z}], where 1{Z} is the indicator function of event Z. Figure
3.1 graphically visualizes the relationship between the product’s market potential, its
2All our results continue to hold for A(τ) being a random function as long as A(τ) is drawn from a
measurable set of functions.
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selling season, and its availability period.

















Notes. The evolution of the product’s market potential, Qτ , (solid line) and the firm’s inventory
level, It(τ), (dashed line) over time. In the left panel, the firm makes the product available
before the selling season starts, and sells out before the season ends. In the right panel, the
firm misses the beginning of the selling season and has unsold items at the end of the season.
Before the product is first made available, the firm orders the desired inventories at
unit costs, c, and during its availability period, the product is sold at unit price, p > c.
If the product is made available for sale before the selling season starts, i.e., t < B,
then the firm incurs earliness costs. We consider two different sources for such earliness
costs; opportunity costs, o, and idle time holding costs, w. When being too early, the
firm forgoes the opportunity to dedicate its resources into more profitable alternatives,
because offering the product at hand blocks financial resources and scarce capacities.
Ultimately, this leads to lost revenues. To capture this loss of revenue, we charge the
firm opportunity costs per time, o, until the product’s selling season starts. In addition,
before being able to sell the product, the firm has to stock its inventories until the
start of the product’s selling season. As such, the firm experiences idle time holding
costs, w, per unit inventory and time. During the product’s effective time on sale, i.e.,
for τ ∈ {max{t, B}, B + L}, the firm incurs holding costs, h, per unit inventory and
time.3 Given that the firm offers the product from time t on, the product’s inventory
3We differentiate between “pre-season” holding costs, w, and “in-season” holding costs, h, to clearly
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level at time τ ≥ t is It(τ) ≡ [x− (Qt −Qτ )]+, which is non-increasing in τ , and
where z+ = max{z, 0}. Lastly, as the product’s selling season ends, the firm recaptures
a salvage value, s < c, for each unsold item. In summary, the firm seeks to choose
the inventory strategy that maximizes expected profits, comprising the product’s sales
revenues minus procurement, earliness, inventory holding, and salvage costs. Formally,
the firm solves the following optimization problem:
max
x,t
Π(x, t) = E
[
(p− c)x− (o+ wx)(B − t)+ − h
∫ B+L
max{t,B}




At this point, it is worthwhile to clarify how our model relates to the classical
newsvendor model. Recall that the primary focus of the classical newsvendor model
is to determine the optimal inventory scale, x, of a firm that faces an uncertain cus-
tomer demand, Q (Cachon and Ko¨k, 2007). While this question is also present in our
framework, we depart from the classical newsvendor model in two dimensions. First,
we study the repercussions of a stochastic selling season on a firm’s optimal inventory
strategy. In contrast, classical newsvendor models provide only an aggregated view on
the selling season without considering how mistiming costs and specific properties of
the selling season affect a firm’s decision. Secondly, we extend the scope of a firm’s
inventory strategy to include not only the inventory scale, but also the inventory timing.
This latter decision enables a firm to actively manage the adverse effects of a stochastic
selling season, and is therefore a crucial element of a firm’s inventory strategy.
For future reference, we note that the classical newsvendor’s optimal inventory scale,
xNV , satisfies P(Q ≤ xNV ) = p−cp−s .
3.4 The Effects of a Probabilistic Season
Start and Length
As highlighted before, our model setup structurally departs from the standard literature
on stochastic inventory theory by considering that the firm faces an uncertain selling
isolate how the firm’s inability to synchronize the product’s availability period with the selling season
influences the firm’s inventory strategy.
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season. Most notably, this uncertainty is reflected in the probabilistic beginning of the
selling season and the stochastic season length. Figure 3.2 positions our work relative
to the classical newsvendor model.
In this section, we disentangle how these different sources of uncertainty individu-
ally affect the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. We initiate our analysis by establishing
important properties of the firm’s expected profit, Π(x, t), and by discussing the implica-
tions of these properties on the firm’s optimal inventory strategy (§4.1). In a next step,
we investigate two instructive special cases. These scenarios help us to clearly elicit how
the introduction of a stochastic selling season, and the opportunity to choose a product’s
inventory timing influence the firm’s optimal strategy. In the first scenario, we restrict
attention to the effects of a stochastic season length (§4.2), while in the second scenario,
we examine the repercussions of a stochastic season beginning (§4.3). Studying these
different sources of uncertainty in isolation greatly facilitates the understanding of the
combined effects that appear in the fully stochastic model (3.1), which we examine in
Section 5. Additionally, we show that the illustrated special cases also reflect specific
market environments that are present in many industries.















start (§4.3) season (§5)
3.4.1. Structural Properties
For the classical newsvendor model, it is well known that the firm’s expected profits
are concave in the firm’s inventory scale, x (see, e.g., Perakis and Roels, 2008). This
fundamental property of the expected profit function is preserved when the firm faces a
stochastic selling season. All proofs are presented in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.1. For given t, Π(x, t) is strictly concave in x.
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Lemma 3.1 indicates that for any inventory timing that the firm chooses, a unique
profit-maximizing inventory scale exists. In general, however, expected profits are not
concave in the firm’s timing decision, t. This implies that the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy, (x?, t?) = argmaxx,t Π(x, t), is not necessarily an interior solution to the firm’s
optimization problem (3.1). In fact, the firm may find it optimal to make the product
available at the very first opportunity, or to never sell the product at all. To be precise,
the firm knows that the selling season never starts before τ = 0, and never terminates
after τ = bu + lu. Choosing an inventory timing outside this time interval results in
substantial mistiming costs without benefiting customer demand. It is therefore never
economically rational for the firm to offer the product before or after these theoretical
boundaries of the selling season. However, the firm may optimally choose to make the
product available at the very first opportunity, t = 0. In this case, the firm entirely
avoids the risk of losing customers due to a tardy inventory availability. We call this
strategy instant inventory availability. If the firm chooses an inventory timing that
satisfies 0 < t < bu + lu, then we say that the firm pursues a risk exploitation inventory
strategy. By definition, such a strategy is always an interior solution to the firm’s
optimization problem (3.1). The last potentially optimal strategy for the firm is a
market exit. With this strategy, the firm deliberately forgoes any sales by never making
the product available to customers. Obviously, when the firm exits the market, it earns
zero profits. Thus, a market exit is chosen only if any earlier inventory timing leads to
negative expected profits. We will show that this may happen if the firm’s mistiming
costs are severe, or if there is considerable uncertainty in the properties of the selling
season.
3.4.2. Managing a Stochastic Season Length
Given that the start of the selling season is known in advance, what is the optimal
inventory strategy for a product with a probabilistic season length? This question is
prevalent for many products in diverse industries. Consider, e.g., the market for seasonal
sporting goods, and in particular the market for ski equipment. Typically, the first
customers buy their equipment for the new season during late autumn, thereby marking
the well anticipated start of the selling season. The length of the season, however, is
not so easily predictable as it highly depends on the weather conditions during winter
and early spring. A lot of snow in early spring keeps demand high for a long time,
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whereas demand ceases early if the winter months are exceptionally mild. Obviously, at
the time the firm decides on its inventory strategy, these weather conditions are highly
unpredictable. Thus, firms in the market for ski equipment face a substantial uncertainty
regarding the length of their selling season. Besides the seasonal sporting goods industry,
similar issues also arise, e.g., for sun care products, and beach wear.
When the firm knows that the product’s selling season starts at time τ = b, then
the firm never makes the product available for sale prior to the beginning of the season.
This is true because a premature product availability has no upside potential for the
firm, but only results in earliness costs. Formally, the firm would not spur customer
demand with such a strategy since Qτ = Q for all τ ≤ b. It follows immediately that the









It(τ)dτ − (p− s)(x−Qt)+
]
. (3.2)
The firm maximizes the expected product margin net of inventory holding and salvage
costs. Earliness costs are irrelevant for the firm’s decision problem, since the product
is never introduced before the season starts. Clearly, (3.2) is a special case of the fully
stochastic model described in (3.1). Following the discussion in Section 4.1, we notice
that in general, ΠL(x, t) is not jointly concave in x and t; i.e., the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy need not be an interior solution to (3.2). Nevertheless, we begin our analysis
with a discussion of the firm’s optimal risk exploitation inventory strategy. Afterwards,
we characterize the firm’s general optimal inventory strategy.
Lemma 3.2. Any optimal risk exploitation inventory strategy, (x?, t?), simultaneously
satisfies the following two first-order necessary optimality conditions:








x?P(L > t? − b)−
∫ b+lu
t?
dt?(Qt? −Qτ ≤ x?, L > τ − b)dτ
]
= (p− s)dt?(Qt? ≤ x?).
(3.4)
Lemma 3.2 shows that with its optimal risk exploitation inventory strategy, the firm
manages a two-fold tradeoff originating from the two different uncertainties in customer
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demand scale and timing. To be concrete, to offer the right amount of inventories at
the right time, the firm balances the two interdependent tradeoffs between stocking too
much and too little, and between making the product available too early and too late.
For a given inventory timing, the optimal amount of inventories, x?, is determined by
(3.3). This condition has strong similarities with the optimality condition in the classical
newsvendor model. In fact, without the second term on the left-hand side, (3.3) is a
common critical fractile solution which trades off the firm’s underage costs, cu = p− c,
with the overage costs, co = c− s. However, there are two major structural differences
compared to the classical newsvendor solution. Firstly and intuitively, the firm does not
take into account the entire market potential, Q, but only the market potential that
will realize after the product is made available for sale, Qt? . Secondly, the inclusion of
inventory holding costs reduces the firm’s effective underage costs, while simultaneously
increasing the effective overage costs. As a result, the firm’s optimal inventory scale is
adjusted down.
For a given inventory scale, the optimal time to make the product available for
sale is also determined by a marginal analysis (3.4). Postponing the product’s market
availability reduces expected inventory holding costs because the product has to be kept
on stock for a shorter time period. However, such a postponement comes at the cost
of more expected lost sales since more customers that try to buy the product prior to
market availability cannot be served. This leads the firm to choose its optimal inventory
timing, t?, by equating the expected marginal inventory holding cost savings with the
expected marginal lost sales costs.
Lemma 3.2 illustrates two key characteristics that are innate to the firm’s decision
problem. Firstly, there is a high degree of interdependence between the uncertainties in
demand scale and timing, and the firm’s inventory strategy. As a result, x? and t? are
closely interlinked in manifold ways. The optimal inventory scale, x?, is chosen to best
satisfy the market potential at the time of product availability, Qt? , which is obviously a
function of the inventory timing, t?. Inventory holding costs influence both the optimal
inventory scale and timing because the size of these costs depends on both decisions.
Similarly, lost sales costs are also nourished by two different sources: the risk of stocking
too little inventory to satisfy the market potential; and the risk of losing customers
due to a tardy availability of the product. While the first source is well established and
studied in the classical newsvendor literature, the latter source has received considerably
less attention.
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Secondly, as we would expect, higher inventory holding costs force a firm to lower
the product’s inventory scale. While this finding is intuitive, (3.3) shows that the dy-
namics behind this result are more complex than previously postulated in the academic
literature. Specifically, a large part of the classical newsvendor literature proposes that
inventory holding costs increase a firm’s overage costs, while leaving the underage costs
unaffected (see, e.g., Kouvelis and Gutierrez, 1997; Van Mieghem and Rudi, 2002). In
contrast to this perception, however, our analysis reveals that inventory holding costs not
only increase a firm’s overage costs, but also reduce the firm’s underage costs, thereby
keeping the sum of overage and underage costs invariant. This difference has consider-
able implications for the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. To see these repercussions
note how inventory holding costs affect the firm’s critical fractile under the different
approaches. Prior academic literature suggests to augment the firm’s overage costs, co,
with some inventory holding costs, H, to receive the adjusted critical fractile cu
cu+co+H
. In
contrast, (3.3) shows that the correct structure of the critical fractile adjusted for inven-
tory holding costs is cu−H
cu+co
. Three important managerial implications abound from our
finding. First, Lemma 3.2 provides an exact characterization of the inventory hold-
ing cost term that is required for a correct adjustment of the critical fractile, i.e.,
H(x, t) = h
∫ b+lu
t
P(Qt − Qτ ≤ x, L > τ − b)dτ . Second, since cu−Hcu+co < cucu+co+H , the
classical approach underestimates the negative effect of inventory holding costs on a
product’s profitability. Most notably, our approach always leads to a smaller optimal
inventory scale. Third, as can be seen in (3.3), the firm endogenously determines the
relevant inventory holding costs by choosing the product’s inventory timing. Thus, the
additional timing flexibility enables the firm to actively manage the product’s optimal
target service level and to increase the product’s profitability. We are now ready to
establish the firm’s optimal inventory strategy.
Proposition 3.1. The firm’s optimal inventory strategy is as follows:
(a) In the absence of inventory holding costs, h = 0, the firm makes the product
instantly available at the start of the selling season, t? = b, with the optimal inventory
scale satisfying P(Q ≤ x?) = p−c
p−s .
(b) Suppose the firm incurs inventory holding costs, h > 0. Then, there exists a
decreasing and continuously differentiable function h(c) such that the firm (i) pursues
the risk exploitation inventory strategy defined in Lemma 3.2 if h ≤ h(c); or (ii) exits
the market otherwise.
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Proposition 3.1 establishes how inventory holding costs and the different sources of
uncertainty affect the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. As we would intuitively expect,
if the firm is not charged any inventory holding costs, then it is optimal to pursue an
instant product availability strategy. This is true because postponing the product’s
availability leads to a reduced market potential without resulting in any cost savings.
Thus, deferring the product’s inventory timing is never beneficial for the firm.
Remarkably, in the absence of inventory holding costs, the firm’s optimal inventory
scale resolves the classical newsvendor tradeoff. In such a situation, the uncertainty
in the selling season, S, does not generate any additional costs for the firm, but only
complicates the derivation of the appropriate market potential distribution. In fact, the
firm needs to use the marginal distribution of Q by averaging over all possible realizations
of the stochastic selling season, S. In practice, this result implies that firms that do not
suffer from inventory holding costs and that have a good understanding of how the
properties of their selling season affect the product’s market potential can determine
their optimal inventory strategy by simply applying the classical newsvendor model.
Yet, as Proposition 3.1(b) indicates, this is no longer true when a firm incurs inven-
tory holding costs because these costs fundamentally change the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy. With h > 0, it is never optimal to make the product instantly available. As a
result, the product’s selling season and its availability period no longer coincide. Instead,
the firm either follows a risk exploitation strategy, or it decides to exit the market. Two
levers critically determine which strategy the firm chooses in optimum: the magnitude
of the inventory holding costs, and the amount of uncertainty involved. If there is only
low uncertainty regarding the season length and holding costs are moderate, then the
firm pursues a risk exploitation strategy. In contrast, if the involved uncertainty is severe
and holding costs are high, then being on the market is too costly for the firm. In such
a situation, the product generates negative expected profits and therefore, the firm has
to abandon the product.
Previously, U¨lku¨ et al. (2005) have shown that a firm may sacrifice some of its
product’s market potential in order to receive more advanced demand information. We
provide another explanation why firms may deliberately reduce their market potential
by delaying their inventory availability: the existence of inventory holding costs. In
practice, most firms incur inventory holding costs for their products. Our results re-
veal that firms that ignore these costs suffer from a premature product availability and
excessive stocks. Obviously, this problem is most severe for products with substantial in-
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ventory holding costs and long selling seasons because for these products, an ill-designed
inventory strategy can fully erode the firm’s profits. For instance, based on the classical
newsvendor literature, a naive decision-maker could be misled to follow a simple “now
or never” timing strategy, i.e., make the product instantly available or exit the market.
However, in the presence of inventory holding costs, Proposition 3.1(b) clearly shows
that such a strategy cannot be optimal. Instead, the main question for the firm is: how
long to postpone product availability? This result is consistent with recent findings of Ke
et al. (2013) who show that operational costs induce a firm to postpone the introduction
timing of successive product generations.
3.4.3. Managing a Stochastic Season Start
External factors such as general weather conditions, the spread of diseases, or the occur-
rence of fashion trends may not only influence the length of a product’s selling season,
but also the season’s beginning. Consider for instance the market for pollen allergy
drugs. The selling season for these drugs typically coincides with the blooming period
of allergy-causing trees and plants. While over the years blooming periods are relatively
stable in their length, their beginning can heavily change from one year to another.
Unfortunately, predicting the start of a blooming period is a tough challenge as seasons
highly depend on climatic conditions such as precipitation and temperature. Therefore,
manufacturers of pollen allergy drugs oftentimes face a selling season with a probabilis-
tic beginning and an almost deterministic length. Such a market environment is not
exclusive for allergy drugs, but is also prevalent, e.g., in the agrochemical industry.
In this section, we study a firm’s optimal inventory strategy for a product that
is sold over a selling season with a probabilistic beginning and a deterministic length.
We are particularly interested in how the stochasticity of the season beginning and the
occurrence of earliness costs affect the firm’s inventory scale and timing. For now, to
better isolate these two effects, we disregard any inventory holding costs by setting
h = 0. The omission of inventory holding costs helps us to clearly elicit the role that
opportunity and idle time holding costs play in determining the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy. (We reintroduce inventory holding costs in Section 5 when we discuss our
full model.) In a market environment as described above, the firm maximizes expected
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product margins minus the expected earliness and salvage costs:
max
x,t
ΠB(x, t) = E
[
(p− c)x− (o+ wx)(B − t)+ − (p− s)(x−Qt)+
]
. (3.5)
Similar to the preceding section, we first establish the firm’s optimal risk exploitation
strategy, and then characterize the firm’s general optimal inventory strategy.
Lemma 3.3. Any optimal risk exploitation inventory strategy, (x?, t?), simultaneously
satisfies the following two first-order necessary optimality conditions:




P(B ≥ b)db = p− c
p− s (3.6)
(o+ wx?)P(B ≥ t?) = (p− s)dt?(Qt? ≤ x?). (3.7)
The firm’s optimal risk exploitation strategy is again aimed at resolving two in-
tertwined tradeoffs: for a given inventory timing, the inventory scale, x?, is chosen to
balance the risk of having insufficient inventories with the costs of having excess stocks
(3.6); for a given inventory scale, the inventory timing, t?, is chosen to balance potential
earliness cost savings with the risk of losing customers (3.7). There are strong analogies
between Lemma 3.3 and the results discussed in Lemma 3.2. Recall that (3.3) indicates
that “in-season” holding costs, h, reduce the firm’s optimal inventory scale. Intutitively,
(3.6) reveals that “pre-season” holding costs, w, have a similar influence on the firm’s in-
ventory scale. Importantly, however, both effects are not identical because their size is in
general substantially different. It is also noteworthy that opportunity costs, o, influence
the firm’s optimal inventory scale, x?, only indirectly through the firm’s choice of the
product’s inventory timing, t?. This is true because opportunity costs are independent
of the chosen inventory scale, but only depend on the firm’s inventory timing decision.
Conversely, procurement costs, c, have no direct impact on the firm’s optimal inventory
timing, as c does not affect the firm’s mistiming costs.
Despite the above analogies, Lemma 3.3 also reveals that an uncertain season start
has fundamentally different implications for the firm’s risk exploitation inventory strat-
egy than an uncertain season length. To be specific, the main difference is that the
firm may now introduce the product before customers actually demand the product.
This is in contrast to an implicit assumption shared in the newsvendor and new product
introduction literature that the firm can always sell a product to customers once it is
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introduced on the market. In the absence of explicit mistiming costs, this assumption
may be rather unproblematic. Yet, once a firm incurs earliness costs, the stochasticity
in the beginning of the selling season seriously changes the firm’s inventory scale and its
inventory timing, because earliness costs alter the firm’s per unit underage and overage
costs, and equally importantly, the firm’s mistiming costs. Without earliness costs, a
postponement of the product availability only has a negative impact on firm profits due
to a reduced market potential. With the inclusion of earliness costs, however, a counter-
vailing trend is introduced that creates an incentive to postpone the inventory timing.
This result becomes even more explicit when we analyze the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy.
Proposition 3.2. The firm’s optimal inventory strategy is as follows:
(a) In the absence of earliness costs, o = w = 0, the firm makes the product instantly
available, t? = 0, and the optimal inventory scale solves P(Q ≤ x?) = p−c
p−s .
(b) Suppose the firm incurs earliness costs, o+w > 0. Then, there exists a decreas-
ing and continuously differentiable function o(c) such that the firm (i) pursues the risk
exploitation strategy defined in Lemma 3.3 if o ≤ o(c); or (ii) exits the market otherwise.
Without earliness costs, a delay in the product’s inventory availability has no upside,
but only a downside effect because the firm may lose customers and experience lower
sales and higher salvage costs. This imbalance forces the firm to make the product
instantly available at the very first opportunity, t? = 0. Intriguingly, this timing strategy
illustrates the firm’s inability to synchronize the product’s availability period with the
selling season when the season start is stochastic. Note that this problem is not present
when the firm only faces a probabilistic season length. As highlighted in Proposition
3.1(a), if the firm knows the beginning of the selling season, then the firm makes the
product available right at the start of the selling season, thereby achieving an ideal
synchronization between the product’s selling season and its availability period.
Similar to the findings of Proposition 3.1(b), the introduction of mistiming costs
attenuates the trend towards an instant product availability. In fact, the presence of
earliness costs entices the firm to refrain from an instant product availability, and to
delay its inventory timing. The higher the earliness costs, the more the firm strives to
reduce these costs by delaying the time when inventory is made available to customers.
In this endeavor to save costs, however, the firm more and more sacrifices its customer
service as more and more customers are left unserved. This tendency, in turn, has
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detrimental effects on the firm’s sales revenues and therefore may ultimately induce the
firm to remove its product from the market.
Proposition 3.2(a) vividly shows that to tackle the uncertainty in the season start,
the firm tries to execute a “safe” inventory strategy by avoiding any market potential
loss due to an early demand occurrence. Thus, without earliness costs, the firm can com-
pletely offset the adverse effects of an uncertain season start on the product’s market
potential. With increasing earliness costs, however, this “safe” inventory timing becomes
prohibitively expensive. As a result, the firm has to postpone its inventory timing which
increases the risk of losing valuable market potential. Surprisingly, the literature on new
product introductions has so far entirely ignored earliness costs as a determinant of a
firm’s product introduction strategy. Admittedly, due to significant modeling differences
our results are not directly transferable to a new product introduction setting. Never-
theless, we believe that our analysis offers a substantial argument why earliness costs
may also be important for new product introductions.
3.5 Selling over an Uncertain Season
In Section 4, we disentangled the direct effects that a stochastic season start and season
length, respectively, have on the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. We now proceed to
study the interaction between these individual effects. In particular, by solving (3.1),
we establish and analyze the firm’s optimal inventory strategy when the firm faces an
entirely stochastic selling season. Similar to the preceding analysis, we will first discuss
the firm’s optimal risk exploitation strategy. In a second step, we then determine the
firm’s optimal inventory strategy. Lastly, we elaborate on specific properties of this
optimal strategy.
Lemma 3.4. Any optimal risk exploitation inventory strategy, (x?, t?), simultaneously
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satisfies the following two first-order necessary optimality conditions:















x?P(B ≤ t? ≤ B + L)−
∫ bu+lu
t?
dt?(Qt? −Qτ ≤ x?, τ ≤ B + L,B ≤ t?)dτ
]
+ (o+ wx?)P(B ≥ t?) = (p− s)dt?(Qt? ≤ x?).
(3.9)
Lemma 3.4 illustrates three important insights into the dependence structures be-
tween the different sources of uncertainty and the firm’s inventory strategy. Firstly, we
observe that the optimality conditions (3.8) and (3.9) collect the marginal effects that
are already present in the optimality conditions given in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. Thus,
the tradeoffs that a firm experiences when selling a product over a stochastic selling
season are structurally equivalent to the tradeoffs identified in Section 4. Specifically,
the firm balances the costs of having excessive inventories and the costs of offering the
product too early with the opportunity costs of losing customers because of product un-
availability. Secondly, while earliness and salvage costs are not influenced by the mutual
interplay between the uncertainty in the start and the length of the selling season, in-
ventory holding costs are simultaneously affected by both types of uncertainty. This can
be clearly seen by comparing Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 with Lemma 3.4. There is an intuitive
explanation for this finding. Earliness costs depend solely on the relation between the
firm’s inventory timing and the start of the selling season, but not on the season length.
Similarly, irrespective of the specific structure of the selling season, salvage costs are
determined by the chosen inventory scale and the realized market potential. In contrast,
inventory holding costs are determined by the complex interaction between the firm’s
inventory scale and timing, the selling season’s beginning and length, and the market
potential.
Lastly, the firm’s ability to decide on the product’s inventory timing is vital to
actively manage the multiple sources of uncertainty. Without this flexibility, as in the
classical newsvendor setup, the firm could only influence the different cost components by
adjusting the product’s inventory scale. Such an approach, however, impedes an effective
inventory management for products with an uncertain selling season. Most importantly,
to maximize profits, the firm has to be proactive in influencing the product’s inventory
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holding, earliness, and salvage costs by choosing and executing an adequate inventory
strategy. This finding receives further support from the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. The firm’s optimal inventory strategy is as follows:
(a) In the absence of earliness and inventory holding costs, w = o = h = 0, the
firm makes the product instantly available, t? = 0, and the optimal inventory scale solves
P(Q ≤ x?) = p−c
p−s .
(b) Suppose w + o + h > 0. Then, there exists a decreasing and continuously
differentiable function oˆ(c) such that the firm (i) pursues the risk exploitation strategy
defined in Lemma 3.3 if o ≤ oˆ(c); or (ii) exits the market otherwise.







Notes. The firm’s optimal inventory strategy with respect to the opportunity costs, o, and the
procurement costs, c, given that w = h = 0. The firm chooses an instant product availability
if o = 0, a risk exploitation strategy in the gray region, and a market exit elsewise.
Figure 3.3 visualizes the results of Proposition 3.3. Not surprisingly, the firm makes
the product instantly available whenever there are no earliness and inventory holding
costs. This is no longer true once the firm also incurs costs for making the product
available to customers. Then, the firm defers its inventory timing to reduce the charged
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earliness and inventory holding costs. Such a risk exploitation inventory strategy is opti-
mal as long as opportunity and procurement costs remain moderate. Once opportunity
costs surpass a critical level, oˆ(c), the firm refrains from offering the product on the
market because the product becomes more and more unprofitable.
Proposition 3.3 also reveals an intriguing difference between the firm’s reaction
towards uncertainty in customer demand scale, and towards uncertainty in customer
demand timing. Notably, the latter uncertainty has much more severe repercussions on
the firm’s inventory strategy. Specifically, even the joint flexibility to adjust the product’s
inventory scale and timing is not sufficient to always prevent the firm from exiting the
market when the product faces a stochastic selling season. This happens because of the
firm’s inability to reduce the product’s unit costs without sacrificing market potential.
As a consequence, the firm may not be able to compensate all costs that arise from the
uncertain selling season, leaving the product with a negative effective unit margin. This
finding highlights the need for a carefully chosen inventory strategy. We next present
two important results that follow from Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.1. If the product’s market potential, Q, and the properties of the selling
season, S, are stochastically independent, then the firm’s optimal inventory scale is
smaller than that of a classical newsvendor, x? ≤ xNV , with equality if and only if
w = o = h = 0.
Corollary 3.1 summarizes the effects of a stochastic selling season on the firm’s
optimal inventory scale. If the product’s market potential is not affected by the specific
structure of the selling season, then both, the firm and a classical newsvendor face
the same inventory scaling problem: how much inventory to stock to best satisfy the
uncertain market potential, Q? Although this initial question is identical for both firms,
their answer is different. A classical newsvendor always stocks more than a firm that
also experiences stochasticity in the selling season because this additional uncertainty
makes it more expensive for the firm to have excess stocks. As a result, the firm becomes
more conservative in its inventory scaling decision.
Intriguingly, this argument no longer holds if Q and S are stochastically dependent.
Consider, e.g., a market where a late (early) season start is associated with a high (low)
market potential. In such a situation, a firm could bet on a late season start. The firm
would postpone product availability, save on earliness costs, and try to exploit the large
market potential. Ultimately, this additional timing flexibility may induce the firm to
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stock more than a classical newsvendor who is not able to actively manage the product’s
market potential by shifting the inventory timing.
Corollary 3.2. The firm’s expected profit, Π(x, t), increases in p and s, and decreases
in c, o, w, and h, if the firm’s inventory strategy is either held fixed or adjusted optimally
as the parameters change.
The firm’s expected profits change monotonically in all revenue and cost parameters.
As we would intuitively expect, the firm always benefits from a higher sales price, p,
and a higher salvage value, s. In contrast, the firm suffers from eroding profits when
procurement costs, c, opportunity costs, o, and holding costs, w and h, increase.
While the firm’s expected profits are monotonic, we now show that the optimal
inventory strategy does not exhibit such a monotonic behavior. We establish this im-
portant result through a series of Lemmas. In a first step, we analyze whether the firm’s
optimal inventory scale, x?, changes monotonically with the firm’s inventory timing,
t. One might expect that x? decreases in t because a later inventory timing implies a
stochastically smaller market potential for the product, which in turn should entice the
firm to stock less inventories. However, Lemma 3.5 indicates that this intuitive reasoning
is not necessarily true.
Lemma 3.5. (a) If the firm incurs neither earliness nor inventory holding costs, then
the firm’s optimal inventory scale, x?(t), decreases in the inventory timing, t.
(b) There exist situations when the firm’s optimal inventory scale, x?(t), increases
in t.
The interplay between the firm’s optimal inventory scale and timing is determined
by two countervailing effects. On the one hand, with a late inventory timing, the firm
sacrifices sales because the expected number of customers that try to buy the product
prior to the product’s availability period increases in t. Thus, the product’s market
potential decreases and the firm is induced to reduce the product’s inventory scale. On
the other hand, a delayed inventory timing reduces the expected earliness and inventory
holding costs that the firm has to pay. Less earliness and holding costs, in turn, increase
(decrease) the firm’s effective underage (overage) costs. Ultimately, this gives the firm
a reason to choose a higher inventory scale.
Whether the firm’s inventory scale decreases in the inventory timing decision, or not,
crucially depends on the relation between these two effects. Obviously, if the firm does
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not incur any earliness or inventory holding costs at all, then a delayed inventory timing
does not result in any cost savings. In such a situation, the firm’s inventory scale always
decreases in t to account for the product’s reduced market potential. Yet, if earliness
costs are high and delaying the inventory timing has only a small effect on the product’s
market potential, then the firm may actually increase the product’s inventory scale as
t increases. In this case, the expected cost savings outweigh the negative influence of a
smaller customer base.
This finding is remarkable. Lemma 3.5(b) implies that a firm may actually build
larger inventories although it serves stochastically less customers. As such, this result is
fundamentally different from any common logic in the classical newsvendor model where
a stochastically smaller market potential always leads to lower inventories (see, e.g., Li,
1992). The reason for this difference is the explicit consideration of the product’s selling
season together with the associated mistiming costs. These mistiming costs introduce a
novel tradeoff that is not present in the classical newsvendor literature: the tradeoff be-
tween the length of the product’s availability period and the size of the product’s market
potential. Although a short availability period only offers a small market potential, it is
cheap to serve. In contrast, a long availability period promises a large market potential,
but serving a long period may be overly costly.
Lemma 3.6. (a) For fixed t, x? increases in p and s; decreases in c, h, and w; and is
invariant in o.
(b) For fixed x, t? increases in w, o, h, and s; decreases in p; and is invariant in c.
The direct influence of the different revenue and cost parameters on the firm’s
optimal inventory scale and timing, respectively, is summarized in Lemma 3.6. As in
the classical newsvendor model, the firm’s inventory scale increases in the sales price,
p, and salvage value, s, and decreases in the procurement costs, c. This is true because
p and s have a positive impact on the product’s unit margin, whereas c has a negative
impact. Similarly, the optimal inventory scale also decreases in w and h since idle time
and inventory holding costs exert a negative influence on the product’s profit margin.
Interestingly, however, opportunity costs do not have any effect on the firm’s inventory
scale for given t, because o does not influence a product’s unit profit margin.
Clearly, the firm postpones its inventory timing if earliness and holding costs in-
crease. Less intuitive, however, is the effect of p, c, and s on the firm’s optimal inventory
timing. As can be verified in (3.9), the product’s sales price and salvage value deter-
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mine the firm’s effective tardiness costs. For the firm, tardiness evokes additional lost
sales and thus, more items need to be salvaged at the end of the season. This downside
of a delayed inventory timing is most severe when the sales price, p, is high and the
the salvage value, s, is low. Consequently, the optimal inventory timing decreases in p
and increases in s. Finally, the firm’s timing decision is not affected by the product’s
procurement costs because c has no impact on the firm’s mistiming costs.
Lemma 3.6 shows that, in isolation, the different revenue and cost parameters have
a monotonic influence on the firm’s optimal inventory scale and timing, respectively. As
the next Proposition indicates this monotonicity of the optimal inventory strategy is not
preserved for all parameters when including all indirect effects. Specifically, opportunity
costs and procurement costs have an ambiguous effect on the firm’s optimal inventory
strategy.
Proposition 3.4. (a) While the firm’s optimal inventory timing, t?, increases in the
opportunity costs, o, the optimal inventory scale, x?, may increase or decrease in o.
(b) While the firm’s optimal inventory scale, x?, decreases in the procurement costs,
c, the optimal inventory timing, t?, may increase or decrease in c.
Proposition 3.4 offers two surprising results that highlight the substitution effects
between the firm’s inventory scale and timing. Firstly, the firm may respond to a higher
operational cost burden by increasing the product’s inventory scale while at the same
time shortening the product’s availability period. Clearly, with higher opportunity costs,
the firm always postpones the product’s inventory availability in order to dampen the
burden of increasing earliness costs. At the same time, the firm reduces the costs of
having left-over inventories at the end of the selling season, thereby creating an incentive
to increase the product’s inventory scale. Thus, when mistiming costs increase, the firm
sacrifices some of the product’s market potential, but tries to serve a larger portion of
the remaining customer demand.
Secondly, when confronted with higher procurement costs, the firm may find it op-
timal to extend the product’s availability period, while limiting the product’s inventory
scale. Intuitively, since higher procurement costs erode the product’s unit margin, the
firm always reduces the available inventories. Having less inventories, however, makes
it cheaper for the firm to offer the product on the market. This explains why the firm
may optimally choose to make the product available earlier. Intriguingly, as a result,
the firm serves a higher market potential with less inventories.
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3.6 Conclusions
A key concern of many firms is to determine an appropriate inventory strategy for a
seasonal product that possesses a demand pattern “with an uncertain start date, an
uncertain end date, and whose size cannot be known in advance with certainty” (Allen
and Schuster, 2004, p. 227). Prior academic literature has provided manifold examples
of products that suffer from such uncertainties in demand scale and timing (e.g., Chen
and Yano, 2010, and references therein), but without offering explicit guidance on how
to optimally manage inventories under these adverse market conditions. Our main con-
tribution is to provide a formal framework on the tradeoffs arising from the different
sources of demand uncertainty, and to give recommendations on how to successfully
manage products in such volatile market environments.
Our results have important implications for managers in charge of products with
uncertain customer demand patterns. Managers need to be aware of the tradeoff between
the length of a product’s availability period and the product’s market potential. While
at first glance, it may seem a promising strategy to serve as high a market potential as
possible, our results reveal that an uncertain selling season paired with mistiming costs
impedes such a naive strategy. Moreover, managers should exploit the substitution
effects between a product’s inventory scale and its inventory timing. This involves
making counter-intuitive decisions: when mistiming costs are relatively high, managers
should choose relatively short availability periods, but offer relatively high inventories.
Our analysis also highlights that managers do well not to underestimate the negative
impact of an uncertain timing of customer demand. Simply shortening a product’s
availability period may not always be a prudent response. Albeit such a strategy enables
the reduction of the inventory and mistiming costs, it also sacrifices valuable market
potential. When this latter effect dominates, products are suffering from devouring
revenues. To combat this detrimental tendency, managers have to carefully rebalance
their inventory scaling and timing decisions. At the very extreme, when the timing
uncertainty is too severe, managers may also be left with a product accruing no profits.
Ultimately, we stress the importance for managers to have a clear understanding of
how their operational costs affect a product’s optimal inventory strategy. As our results
suggest, disregarding some of these effects leads to inadequate decisions. Inventory
holding costs are a notable example for this phenomenon. They simultaneously exert
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a subtle influence on a product’s mistiming costs as well as on the firm’s effective lost
sales costs. When ignoring the interaction between these two effects, a manager is likely
to overestimate both, the product’s optimal inventory level and the optimal time on the
market.
Our analytical framework offers a strong foundation on which future studies can
build. By restricting our attention to a single firm, we have made a first step towards
the understanding of how a stochastic selling season affects a firm’s inventory decisions.
Yet, in practice, many firms sell their products not only in an uncertain market environ-
ment, but also under intense competition. Investigating how firms adapt their inventory
strategy under competition is an exciting alley for further research. The occurrence of
rival firms would force a firm to simultaneously engage in quantity and time competition.
Whether such competition induces firms to strive for an early market entry, or to prefer
a late market release, is an open question.
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Substitution Effects in a Supply
Chain with Upstream Competition
with Moritz Fleischmann1
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, a diverse body of research has focused on how firms should optimally
react to customer substitution. For firms that directly serve customers, investigations
range from strategic assortment planning (Ko¨k and Fisher, 2007; Honhon et al., 2010)
over promotion strategies (Walters, 1991) to optimal stocking decisions (Netessine and
Rudi, 2003; Jiang et al., 2011). In a supply chain setting, only the most downstream stage
directly experiences the impact of customer substitution; however, indirect substitution
effects also diffuse across the entire supply chain. This essay therefore investigates how
different stages of a supply chain are affected by customer substitution. In particular,
we examine the optimal production and stocking decisions of different supply chain
members under upstream competition and vertical information asymmetries.
We are interested in markets where competition and substitution arise simultane-
ously within the supply chain. While competition occurs due to the non-cooperative
behavior of independent firms, substitution emerges from the competitive structures
within the set of available products. Note that competition and substitution are neither
inclusive nor exclusive concepts: Competition without substitution arises if multiple in-
dependent firms offer an identical product (in a supply chain setting, e.g., Cachon, 2001;
Adida and DeMiguel, 2011), while substitution without competition occurs if a monop-
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Substitution Effects in a Supply
Chain with Upstream Competition”, coauthored with Moritz Fleischmann.
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olistic firm offers non-identical, yet similar products that serve a common customer base
(e.g., Nagarajan and Rajagopalan, 2008).
Initially, our work is motivated by the agrochemical market. Agrochemical manu-
facturers sell their products through locally monopolistic wholesalers to their customers,
mostly farmers or farmer unions. Substitution in this market arises from customers’
focus on active ingredients, resulting in low brand loyalty. In consequence, stock-outs at
the wholesaler lead to high substitution rates among products. This effect is even fur-
ther enhanced by the inherent finiteness of the selling season for agrochemicals and the
non-durability of some chemical components. Information asymmetries in this market
stem from the wholesaler’s bargaining power and the substantial production lead-times
at the manufacturers which can amount to two years (Shah, 2004). While production
needs to be initiated well in advance of the desired selling season, the wholesaler cannot
be forced to commit to order quantities at this early stage. Final orders are typically
released close to the selling season when (weather-dependent) demand can be predicted
sufficiently well. In essence, production and ordering decisions are based on potentially
different information sets, and thus, vertical information asymmetries arise.
To analyze the manufacturer’s (wholesaler’s) optimal production quantities (stock-
ing levels), we consider a supply chain in which potentially multiple manufacturers sell
partially substitutable products for a single season through a monopolistic wholesaler.
We focus on a single period setting because (i) it yields a very good approximation of the
agrochemical market where the selling season is finite and some chemical components
cannot be stored until the next season; and (ii) it is a necessary first step in the analysis
of substitution effects within supply chains which is in line with the existing literature
and thus makes our results comparable. To capture the influence of upstream competi-
tion, we compare two distinct supply chain scenarios: a horizontally integrated (hereafter
’non-competitive’) supply chain with a single manufacturer producing all available prod-
ucts; and a horizontally competitive (hereafter ’competitive’) supply chain with multiple
manufacturers, each producing only one product. While inspired by the agrochemical
market, our framework generally suits industries in which (1) products are partial sub-
stitutes, (2) products and market structures exhibit typical newsvendor characteristics,
and (3) customers are served by a monopolistic wholesaler.
Our work contributes to the literature on (i) vertical information asymmetries in
supply chains; and, most importantly, (ii) optimal stocking levels under customer sub-
stitution. Information sharing within supply chains has been a prevalent research area
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in the last decades (Li, 2002; O¨zer and Wei, 2006). Apart from the issue of truthful
information sharing, literature also investigates how asymmetric information affect op-
erational problems. In the presence of short capacity at the manufacturer, Cachon and
Lariviere (1999) show that wholesalers exploit their informational advantage by ma-
nipulating the manufacturer’s allocation mechanism. Under asymmetric information,
Corbett (2001) depicts that the introduction of consignment stocks at the wholesaler
leads to reduced cycle stocks at the expense of increased safety stocks. If wholesalers
are allowed to share inventories, Yan and Zhao (2011) conclude that wholesalers share
demand information with each other, but not with the manufacturer. We extend this
research stream by characterizing how the interaction between information asymmetries
and customer substitution impacts supply chain decision making.
There has been an extensive literature on the repercussions of customer substitution
on the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels. As common building block, the single-stage
newsvendor inventory (competition) model with stock-out-based substitution as pio-
neered by McGillivray and Silver (1978), Parlar (1988), Lippman and McCardle (1997),
Bassok et al. (1999), Smith and Agrawal (2000), and Netessine and Rudi (2003) has
evolved. In a seminal paper, Netessine and Rudi (2003) extend the preceding work
by characterizing the structure of the optimal stocking levels for an arbitrary number
of products under centralization and competition. Based on these results, recent work
has investigated various competitive environments under customer substitution. Mishra
and Raghunathan (2004), Kraiselburd et al. (2004), and Kim (2008) explore the conse-
quences of introducing Vendor Managed Inventory for the wholesaler’s stocking levels
and advertisement efforts. Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008) embed the substitution
framework into a multi-period setting, and Jiang et al. (2011) provide a robust optimiza-
tion approach that determines stocking levels by minimizing absolute regret. Recently,
Vulcano et al. (2012) have developed an efficient procedure to empirically estimate re-
quired substitution parameters.
As common in the newsvendor framework, existing models assume that the whole-
saler is unconstrained in his stocking decision, i.e., any arbitrary amount of products
can be stocked. Being true in a single-stage setting, this assumption is problematic in a
supply chain setting. Here, a manufacturer’s production or capacity decision constitutes
a natural upper bound on the wholesaler’s decision space (compare this to the litera-
ture on capacity choice, e.g., Cachon and Lariviere, 1999; Montez, 2007). By explicitly
integrating these dependencies into our model, we make a two-fold contribution to the
63
IV. Substitution Effects in a Supply Chain with Upstream Competition
existing literature: first, we investigate a constrained wholesaler’s optimal stocking de-
cision; second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine how customer
substitution affects the production decision of upstream stages. To be specific, the main
contributions of this essay are as follows: (1) We derive the optimal stocking levels of
a constrained wholesaler and characterize the non-monotonic effects that a change in
a manufacturer’s production quantity exerts on these stocking levels. (2) We formally
analyze the influence of changing substitution rates on the wholesaler’s stocking levels.
In contrast to an intuitive conjecture of Netessine and Rudi (2003), we show that stock-
ing levels for certain products may increase even if customer substitution away from
these products increases. (3) We characterize the optimal production quantities of an
incompletely informed manufacturer with and without upstream competition by apply-
ing a Bayesian (Nash-) Stackelberg game. (4) We explicitly compare monopolistic and
competitive optimal production quantities and find that competition may lead to re-
duced production. (5) We show that for some products, end-of-season inventories at the
manufacturer may decrease under competition, even when initial production quantities
increase.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The structure of the supply
chain under consideration and the distribution of information are described in §4.2.
Furthermore, we elaborate on the properties of the resulting supply chain game. In §4.3,
we present our model of a constrained wholesaler and derive the optimal stocking levels.
We proceed by analyzing the effects of changing substitution rates on these optimal
stocking levels. The manufacturer’s production quantities are the focus of §4.4. We first
characterize the equilibrium production quantities of a manufacturer under competition,
before determining a monopolistic manufacturer’s optimal production quantities. We
then compare monopolistic and competitive production quantities, and examine the
manufacturer’s end-of-season inventories under both scenarios. Section 4.5 provides a
discussion of our results and concluding remarks.
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4.2 Supply Chain Structure and Informa-
tion Distribution
We consider a two-stage supply chain with possibly multiple manufacturers (she) and
a single wholesaler (he) selling n ≥ 2 partially substitutable products for one period.
While competition among manufacturers at the upstream stage may arise, we restrict
attention to a monopolistic downstream wholesaler. In the non-competitive situation, a
single manufacturer provides all n products (bilateral monopoly), whereas in the com-
petitive scenario, n independent manufacturers each produce a different product (uni-
lateral monopoly with upstream competition). Figure 4.1 illustrates both supply chain
structures. In the agrochemical market, a monopolistic manufacturer occurs whenever
a family of patents that allows for the provision of different, yet substitutable products
is exclusively held by a single firm. In contrast, upstream competition is introduced if
different manufacturers hold different patents for similar, but not identical products, or
if patents run out.












































We assume that information is asymmetrically distributed between manufacturers
and the wholesaler. As mentioned earlier, this vertical information asymmetry between
supply chain stages arises naturally in the agrochemical market due to the wholesaler’s
bargaining power and manufacturers’ production lead-times. Besides such market-driven
causes for differing information sets, scholars have also identified many other reasons,
including technological issues (Lee and Whang, 2000) and the fear of information leakage
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(Anand and Goyal, 2009). To be precise, in line with the literature on vertical informa-
tion asymmetries, e.g., Li (2002), O¨zer and Wei (2006) and Yan and Zhao (2011), we
assume that manufacturers are incompletely informed about the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking levels. In contrast, upstream information are common knowledge across man-
ufacturers, i.e., no horizontal information asymmetry arises, and production quantities
are commonly verifiable. These assumptions are reasonable in the agrochemical mar-
ket since manufacturers produce substitutable, hence comparable products and thus,
they are able to credibly estimate their competitors’ cost structures. Furthermore, for a
“fair” comparison of production quantities, we need to ensure that decisions are based
on identical information sets under both supply chain structures. Following the argu-
ment of Harsanyi (1968) and Myerson (2004), we assume that manufacturers hold a
common prior belief about the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels. Hence, manufac-
turers’ beliefs are consistent. This prior belief represents the manufacturers’ perception
about the collection of information that are not common knowledge. In summary, sup-
ply chain structure and information distribution imply a Bayesian (Nash-) Stackelberg
Game as first introduced by Gal-Or (1987). The relevant case of multiple-leader Stack-
elberg games has first been studied by Sherali (1984) and recently by DeMiguel and Xu
(2009), but only for complete, non-Bayesian information structures.
The sequence of events is as follows: In the first stage, manufacturers maximize ex-
pected profits and determine their optimal production quantities, based on their beliefs
about the wholesaler’s subsequent stocking levels. In the second stage, before the start
of the selling season, the wholesaler learns these production quantities and, given his
private information, derives his optimal stocking levels by maximizing expected profits.
Afterwards, orders are submitted and shipped before the selling season starts. Through-
out the selling season the wholesaler experiences customer demand and realizes profits.
We refer to the subgame with given production quantities as the Ordering Game, while
the entire game is denoted as the Supply Game. As such, production quantities are
exogenously given in the Ordering Game, while they are decision variables in the Supply
Game. Figure 4.2 summarizes the chronology.
We assume that stochastic customer demand appears exclusively at the wholesaler
and no manufacturer can pursue a direct selling strategy. Prices are exogenously given
by the market and neither player can negotiate on the price to pay. Furthermore, we
restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
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4.3 The Ordering Game
Focusing on the Stackelberg follower in this section, we derive the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking levels given the manufacturers’ production quantities and characterize its sen-
sitivity with respect to (i) changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity, and (ii)
substitution effects.
4.3.1. Optimal Stocking Levels
For each product i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the wholesaler pays a unit wholesale price wi to the
manufacturer and sells the product at a unit retail price ri, satisfying ri > wi > 0.
Additionally, the wholesaler incurs a unit holding or disposal cost of hi ≥ 0 for each
unsold item. Total demand occurrence follows the standard model of stock-out-based
substitution processes as defined by Netessine and Rudi (2003), Ko¨k et al. (2009), and
Jiang et al. (2011). Customers arrive at the wholesaler with an initial product preference.
Thus, the wholesaler faces random initial demand for product i given by Di, which is
assumed to have a continuous demand distribution with positive support. Second choice
(substitution) demand stems from customers whose initially preferred product is out of
stock. If a stock-out of product i occurs, an exogenously given fraction αij of unserved
customers is willing to substitute from product i to j; naturally
∑
j 6=i αij ≤ 1 for all
i. Each initially unserved customer makes at most one substitution attempt, which, if
again unserved, results in a lost sale. Total demand for product i after substitution is
denoted by Dsi = Di +
∑
j 6=i αji max{0, Dj − xj}, where xj is the wholesaler’s stocking
level for product j. For future reference, denote by x−j the (n − 1)-dimensional vector
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of stocking levels for all products i 6= j.
Let x be the vector of stocking levels and ΠW (x) be the wholesaler’s expected profit
when choosing x. Since the vector of production quantities y is common knowledge and
verifiable, the wholesaler faces an optimization problem under complete information.




ΠW (x) = E
[∑
i





uixi − (ui + oi) max{xi −Dsi , 0}
]
, (4.1)
where ui = ri − wi and oi = hi + wi are the wholesaler’s underage and overage costs,
respectively. The wholesaler’s objective is to maximize his expected profit under the
quantity restrictions imposed by the manufacturers’ production y. If there are no such
restrictions, we let y =∞ and refer to this case as the unconstrained problem P∞. We
start our analysis of the optimal stocking levels with a brief discussion on the properties
of ΠW (x). All proofs are given in Appendix C.
Lemma 4.1. For arbitrary i and given x−i, ΠW (x) is not concave in xi, in general.
Lemma 4.1 formalizes the numerical results in Netessine and Rudi (2003) that
ΠW (x) is not always concave in each individual stocking level xi. This also implies that
ΠW (x) is not necessarily jointly concave in x, either. Thus, there may exist multiple local
optima. For the unconstrained problem P∞, we know from Proposition 1 in Netessine
and Rudi (2003) that the optimal stocking levels xˆ must simultaneously satisfy the
following first-order necessary optimality conditions for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:










In the remainder, denote by xˆi(x−i) the solution to product i’s optimality condition
(4.2) for given fixed values of x−i. Analogously, let xˆ−i(xi) be the solution vector of the
remaining (n − 1) optimality conditions in (4.2) for products j 6= i if xi is fixed. We
further refer to product j’s entry in xˆ−i(xi) as xˆj(xi). By Lemma 4.1, it is not ensured
that xˆi(x−i) is unique. Therefore, for a given problem instance Py, we define xˆi(x−i)
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to be the largest solution that is feasible in Py and for simplicity, we let xˆi(x−i) ≡ ∞
if there exists no feasible solution. The introduction of this tie-breaking rule ensures
uniqueness of xˆi(x−i) and helps us to avoid ambiguities when comparing two scenarios
with multiple optima.
The interpretation of (4.2) is appealing. It is a standard newsvendor fractile solu-
tion, adjusted by substitution effects. The second term on the left hand side increases
the optimal stocking level to account for additional second choice demand, whereas the
third term reduces the optimal stocking level by considering that a stock-out need not
result in a lost sale. The optimal solution of the constrained problem Py follows a similar
pattern. Whenever feasible, the wholesaler tries to stock the quantity that solves (4.2),
given the other products’ optimal stocking levels. If this is not possible, he procures the
entire available production quantity yi. Proposition 4.1 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 4.1. Denote the vector of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels for the
constrained problem Py by x
?(y). Further, refer to x?(y) as a directionally largest optimal





x′?i (y) for any i. Then, any directionally largest optimal solution simultaneously satisfies
x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}, (4.3)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
From hereon, we explicitly restrict our analysis to directionally largest optimal
solutions. Obviously, each optimization problem Py has at least one directionally largest
optimal solution, and our numerical experiments indicate that non-directionally largest
optimal solutions occur very rarely. Moreover, our subsequent key results highlight some
counter-intuitive effects. We emphasize that if these counter-intuitive findings apply to
directionally largest optimal solutions, then they also apply to the full set of optimal
solutions, but not necessarily vice versa. Thus, the restriction to directionally largest
optimal solutions does not drive our main results, but helps us to avoid ambiguities.
Note that x?(∞) = xˆ. Therefore, the optimal stocking levels given in (4.3) are con-
sistent with the solution to the unconstrained problem P∞ given in Netessine and Rudi
(2003). Furthermore, in any Bayesian (Nash-) Stackelberg equilibrium, the wholesaler
plays his best-response against the manufacturers’ initial decision y, which is given by
x?(y).
69
IV. Substitution Effects in a Supply Chain with Upstream Competition
We now investigate the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels with
respect to changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity. In particular, we are inter-
ested in the question if the wholesaler’s optimal reaction to changes in y is monotonic.
From a manufacturer’s perspective, when altering yi, monotonicity of the wholesaler’s
best-response function at least guarantees predictability of the direction of change of
x?(y), even in the asymmetric information case. In contrast, under information asym-
metries, a non-monotonic best-response function is much harder to predict. We start
our analysis by exogenously forcing one stocking level to increase in the unconstrained
problem P∞.
Lemma 4.2. Let ε > 0 and denote by ei the unit vector for product i.
(i) For given x−i and x′−i = x−i + εej with j 6= i, xˆi(x−i) ≥ xˆi(x′−i).
(ii) For given xj and x
′
j = xj+ε, there are instances of P∞ for which xˆi(xj) < xˆi(x
′
j)
for some i 6= j.
Using the results of Lemma 4.2, we can now endogenize the increasing stocking level
by explicitly considering changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity yj. This is
done in the first part of Proposition 4.2. Building on this result, the second and third
part transfer the findings of Lemma 4.2 to the solution of the constrained problem Py.
Proposition 4.2. Let y′ = y + εej, ε > 0, for arbitrary j. Then:
(i) x?j(y
′) ≥ x?j(y).
(ii) For arbitrary i and j, fix x?k for all k 6= i, j and solve (4.3) for i and j. Then,
there always exist optimal solutions for which x?i (y
′) ≤ x?i (y).
(iii) Solve (4.3) for k = 1, . . . , n. There are instances of Py for which x
?
i (y
′) > x?i (y)
for some i 6= j.
In essence, Proposition 4.2 highlights that the wholesaler’s best-response is not
necessarily monotonic in a manufacturer’s production decision. The reason for this lies
in the multidimensionality of substitution which comprises direct and indirect effects. If
the available production quantity for one product j is increased, (i) and (ii) indicate that
the wholesaler increases his stocks for product j and, all else equal, reduces any other
stock i 6= j. This is the direct effect which is in line with our common understanding of
economic substitutes. However, each increase or decrease in any one product’s stocking
level has immediate effects on all other products’ optimal stocking levels. Hence, if the
wholesaler optimizes his stocking levels across all products, a cascade of indirect effects
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arises due to the mutual interdependency of all products. We find that in some situations
these indirect effects dominate the direct effects so that, in optimum, the wholesaler may
increase stocking levels for more than one product (iii). Indirect effects are dominant
if, e.g., the market’s substitution structure is heterogeneous in the sense that there is
little direct substitution between products j and i, but frequent substitution between
products j and k, and k and i.
4.3.2. Substitution Effects
We now investigate the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels and ex-
pected profit with respect to changing substitution rates. A change in the customers’
reaction to product stock-outs implies changing substitution rates. Naturally, this also
affects the total demand for the wholesaler’s products. To be specific, increasing sub-
stitution rates imply a stochastically larger total demand at the wholesaler, or math-
ematically, Dsi is stochastically increasing in αji for all j 6= i. Intuition suggests that
this increased demand is always beneficial for the wholesaler since the probability of in-
curring lost sales decreases. Moreover, Netessine and Rudi (2003) conjecture intuitively
that optimal stocking levels for a product increase (decrease) if substitution rates to
(from) this product increase. We now test this intuition.
We start our analysis with the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s expected profit. As
already argued, demand is stochastically increasing in any substitution rate. Further-
more, it is well known that, on expectation, a wholesaler benefits from increased demand
if trade is profitable (Li, 1992). Accordingly, the wholesaler’s expected profit increases
in any substitution rate. The following proposition formally states this argument.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose
∑
i 6=j αji < 1. The wholesaler’s expected profit ΠW (x) is in-
creasing in any substitution rate αji if stocking levels x are adjusted optimally to changes
in substitution rates.
Proposition 4.3 is true for the constrained and unconstrained problems Py and P∞,
respectively. Note that, if
∑
i 6=j αji = 1, then αji can only increase if at least one other
substitution rate αjk, k 6= i, simultaneously decreases. In this case, ΠW may actually
decrease in αji.
While the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s expected profit has a monotonic behavior,
we now show that, in contrast to common intuition, his optimal stocking levels might be
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non-monotonic in the substitution rates. As a starting point we analyze how xˆ changes
in αji.
Lemma 4.3. (i) For arbitrary i, ∂xˆi(x−i)/∂αji ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.
(ii) There are instances of P∞ for which ∂xˆj(x−j)/∂αji > 0 for some i and j.
As we would intuitively expect, the wholesaler stocks more of product i if sub-
stitution rates to product i increase. This is happening because the total demand for
product i, Dsi , is stochastically increasing in αji. Contrary to intuition, however, the
optimal stocking level for product j may also increase in αji. This surprising effect is
explained by the increasing stock-out risk for product i. Increasing αji stochastically
increases Dsi , thereby increasing the risk of running out of stock for product i. For given
stocking levels, this decreases the expected quantity of product i that is available for
covering an additional unit of excess demand for product j. Thus, the effective marginal
underage cost for product j increases, which in return justifies a higher stocking level.
Proposition 4.4. There are instances of Py for which dx
?
j/dαji > 0 for some i and j.
Proposition 4.4 highlights that after the inclusion of all direct and indirect substi-
tution dynamics, the total effect of αji on x
?
j can still be positive. Importantly, there are
two independent drivers for this counter-intuitive result. Firstly, and not surprisingly,
this result can be a direct consequence of Lemma 4.3(ii). Secondly, it may also stem from
the substitution cascades identified in Proposition 4.2. In this latter case, Proposition
4.4 can hold even when xˆj(x−j) decreases in αji. The wholesaler increases his stocks for
product j, although there is a higher substitution away from this product, if indirect
substitution dynamics dominate the direct effects. To conclude, Lemma 4.3 together
with Proposition 4.4 indicate that the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels are in general
non-monotonic in the substitution rates.
4.4 The Supply Game
In this section, we analyze the manufacturer’s optimal production quantities under in-
complete information about the wholesaler’s stocking decision. We first focus on the
competitive scenario with multiple Stackelberg leaders and then investigate the situa-
tion with a single Stackelberg leader. Subsequently, we compare the optimal production
quantities for both scenarios and illustrate our findings with a numerical example.
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The Ordering Game which takes production quantities y as given is the second
stage of the Supply Game. In the first stage, manufacturers choose y to maximize their
expected profits given their beliefs about the wholesaler’s subsequent behavior. The
manufacturers’ unit production costs and selling prices for product i are ci and wi,
respectively, with wi > ci > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We assume that manufacturers credibly
and simultaneously announce their production quantities yi. Further, yi ∈ [0, K], with K
sufficiently large so that it never constrains any manufacturer. Since the wholesaler has
private information on his optimal stocking levels, manufacturers can only hold a belief
about the wholesaler’s equilibrium stocking levels. We explicitly model this uncertainty
about the wholesaler’s orders for product i as a random variable with support on Xi(y)
that depends on the chosen production quantities y. To be specific, let χi ∈ Xi(y) with
cumulative distribution Φi(χi, y) and density φi(χi, y) > 0. We assume Φi(χi, y) to be




We restrict attention to rational beliefs.
Definition 4.1. We say that a manufacturer’s belief about the wholesaler’s stocking
levels is rational if it satisfies the following conditions for all products i:
1. Xi(y) = [0, yi];
2. ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂yi∂yj ≥ 0, j 6= i;
3. ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yi ≤ 0 and ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂y2i ≥ 0.
Definition 4.1 ensures three structural properties of a manufacturer’s belief. First,
manufacturers assign a positive probability mass only to non-negative stocking levels
which are naturally bounded from above by the chosen production quantity yi. Second,
ceteris paribus, manufacturers consider all products to be economic substitutes. Third,
production quantities exert a stimulating effect on the wholesaler’s stocking decision,
i.e., stocking levels stochastically increase with the available production quantities, but
at a decreasing rate (for a thorough discussion on stimulating effects of inventories, see
Balakrishnan et al., 2008).
We emphasize that Definition 4.1 imposes very mild restrictions on a manufacturer’s
belief. The wholesaler, by construction, never orders more than y. Therefore, the first
property is in line with the results of Proposition 4.1. The second property ensures that
manufacturers correctly believe that they compete in a substitution market. Finally,
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the third property follows immediately from Proposition 4.2(i) which states that x?i (y)
increases in yi. Irrespective of the kind of information asymmetries, any rational man-
ufacturer can always predict these properties, only the magnitude of these effects may
be unknown to her. Note that we neither require beliefs to be correct on expectation,
nor do we make any assumption on how the belief for product i changes with yj, since
Propositions 4.2(ii) and (iii) indicate that x?i (y) can increase or decrease in yj.
The manufacturer’s decision problem structurally differs in two ways from the one
of the wholesaler. First, the wholesaler’s reaction to limited production quantities is
fundamentally different from the customers’ reaction to stock-outs. While customers
only try to substitute once with a given probability, the wholesaler’s reaction to short
production capacities is based on a non-monotonic optimization strategy across all prod-
ucts. Second, the manufacturer can influence the wholesaler’s stocking level for product
i by changing yi, whereas the wholesaler cannot influence customer demand for product
i by varying xi.
4.4.1. Competing Manufacturers
We now establish the equilibrium of the first stage of the Supply Game when there are
n competing manufacturers, each selling a different, yet partially substitutable product
through a monopolistic wholesaler. Before the wholesaler communicates his stocking
levels, manufacturers simultaneously choose their production quantities. Accordingly,
manufacturers act as Bayesian Stackelberg leaders with respect to the wholesaler, but
as Nash competitors with respect to the other manufacturers. Thus, each manufacturer
maximizes her expected profit, given the other manufacturers’ production quantities
and given her rational beliefs about the wholesaler’s subsequent reaction. Her decision
problem for given y−i is
max
yi≥0
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wiµi(y)− ciyi, (4.4)
where ΠMi(yi|y−i) is the ith manufacturer’s expected profit. For brevity, let ΠMi ≡
ΠMi(yi|y−i) and denote by yci = arg maxyi≥0 ΠMi the ith manufacturer’s best-response
to her competitors’ production quantities y−i.
We start our equilibrium analysis by noting that rational beliefs are sufficient to
guarantee concavity of each manufacturer’s expected profit.
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Lemma 4.4. Assume rational beliefs. Given y−i, ΠMi is a concave function of the
production quantity yi for all i.
Due to the concavity of ΠMi , we can derive each manufacturer’s best-response y
c
i by
examining the first-order conditions which are necessary and sufficient for optimality.
Proposition 4.5. Assume rational beliefs. The following system of first-order necessary









i = 1, . . . , n.
A simple trade-off argument explains the optimality conditions (4.5). On expecta-
tion, increasing the production quantity yi raises the wholesaler’s subsequent stocking
level for product i (see Proposition 4.2). This generates a marginal increase in revenue
given by wi∂µi(y)/∂yi, while simultaneously inducing marginal costs of ci. Equating
marginal revenue and marginal costs provides the desired result. Note that yci con-
stitutes an upper bound on the wholesaler’s decision space. Hence, in any case, the
wholesaler’s stocking level is smaller than yci . Naturally, (4.5) not only determines each
manufacturer’s best-response in the manufacturer Nash game, i.e., in the competition
among leaders, but also persists in the entire Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg game. Here,
any Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium is given by the wholesaler’s optimal stock-
ing levels x?(yc) and the manufacturers’ production quantities yc which form a Nash
equilibrium in the manufacturer Nash game. In a next step, we establish existence and
uniqueness of the manufacturer Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4.6. Assume rational beliefs. For the competitive scenario, a pure-strategy
manufacturer Nash equilibrium exists and is found by solving (4.5). If ΠMi is strictly












i = 1, . . . , n, for all y, then the manufacturer Nash equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 4.6 states two sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the manufacturer
Nash equilibrium. Each manufacturer’s expected profit ΠMi is strictly concave in yi
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if and only if her belief satisfies ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂y
2
i > 0. Further note that a necessary
condition for (4.6) to hold is given by
∑
j 6=i |∂yci/∂yj| < 2. Intuitively, the sensitivity of
each manufacturer’s best-response with respect to the other manufacturers’ production
decisions has to be bounded. A special case where (4.6) is automatically satisfied occurs
if the effects of yi and y−i on µi(y) are additive separable, i.e., µi(y) = gi(yi) + hi(y−i)
for arbitrary differentiable functions gi and hi. If gi is furthermore strictly concave, then
the manufacturer Nash equilibrium is unique.
While Proposition 4.6 ensures uniqueness of the manufacturer Nash equilibrium,
the stated conditions are not sufficient to generally guarantee a unique Bayesian Nash-
Stackelberg equilibrium in the Supply Game. As discussed in §3, the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking levels given the manufacturers’ production quantities are not necessarily unique.
Consequently, the wholesaler might have multiple best-responses. Accordingly, for a
unique equilibrium of the Supply Game, the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels must
also be unique. Corollary 4.1 states a simple condition that guarantees uniqueness.
Corollary 4.1. Let the conditions of Proposition 4.6 hold. Suppose ΠW (x) is jointly
concave in x. Then, the Supply Game has a unique Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilib-
rium in the competitive scenario.
4.4.2. Monopolistic Manufacturer
As a benchmark, we now derive the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium of the Supply
Game without manufacturer competition. To be specific, a monopolistic manufacturer
simultaneously produces all n substitutable products and sells them through a monop-
olistic wholesaler. Therefore, the manufacturer serves as Bayesian Stackelberg leader
with respect to the wholesaler. Thus, she maximizes her expected profit ΠM across all







(wiµi(y)− ciyi) . (4.7)
For given rational beliefs, denote by ync = arg maxy≥0 ΠM(y) a vector of optimal pro-
duction quantities. In contrast to the competitive scenario, the manufacturer’s expected
profit ΠM is not generally concave in y. Thus, first-order optimality conditions provide
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only necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the manufacturer’s optimal production
quantities.
Proposition 4.7. Assume rational beliefs. In any Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium of
the non-competitive scenario, the manufacturer’s production quantities satisfy the system
















i = 1, . . . , n.
Analogously to the optimality conditions of the competitive scenario, the monop-
olistic manufacturer’s optimal decision also follows a trade-off argument. Again, the
manufacturer equates marginal costs and marginal revenues. This time, however, the
shift in revenue accounts not only for the increased revenue for product i, but also for
the altered revenue for all other products j 6= i. Intuitively, the monopolistic manufac-
turer considers the influence of her production quantities on the revenue for all products,
whereas each competitive manufacturer only cares about her own product. Neither the
manufacturer’s optimal production quantities ync nor the wholesaler’s optimal stocking
levels x?(ync) are necessarily unique. In consequence, the Bayesian Stackelberg equi-
librium of the Supply Game is not guaranteed to be unique. A sufficient condition for
uniqueness is given in Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose ΠW (x) and ΠM(y) are jointly concave in x and y, respec-
tively. Then, the Supply Game has a unique Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium in the
non-competitive scenario.
4.4.3. The Consequences of Manufacturer Competition
Competing manufacturers adopt production quantities, yc, that differ substantially from
a monopolistic manufacturer’s production quantities, ync, even though they hold identi-
cal beliefs about the wholesaler’s subsequent stocking levels. In this context, the natural
question arises whether competition causes manufacturers to increase production quan-
tities, i.e., yc > ync? Furthermore, vertical information asymmetries induce supply chain
inefficiencies that manifest in end-of-season inventories at the manufacturer. However,
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are these effects smaller or larger under upstream competition? We now explore these
questions.
Intuition suggests that the wholesaler prefers competing manufacturers to a monop-
olistic manufacturer because we expect production quantities to increase under competi-
tion. Hence, the wholesaler’s decision space would be less restricted under manufacturer
competition and so, he could provide a more profitable service to his customers. Propo-
sition 4.8 shows that this intuition is not always true.









for all products i, then yci ≥ ynci for at least one product i.
(ii) There are rational beliefs such that yci < y
nc
i for some product i.
It can never happen that all production quantities decrease under competition, if
(4.9) holds. This condition ensures that each product has in total a negative effect on the
other products, which is the very nature of substitute products. A sufficient condition
for (4.9) are rational beliefs that additionally satisfy ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yj ≥ 0 for all j 6= i, or
intuitively, each product j should exert a negative influence on every other product i.
Yet, note that Proposition 4.2(iii) indicates that this need not be true for all products.
There exist situations where two products have a positive effect on each other, which
would be reflected by ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yj < 0 for some i and j, and does not contradict our
definition of rational beliefs. Condition (4.9) also captures these contingencies because
we only require the weighted sum over all individual effects, i.e., the aggregated effect, to
be negative, not each single effect. Thus, (4.9) imposes a very mild condition, and any
product that violates it, is eventually an economic complement for the other products.
An availability trade-off explains why a monopolistic manufacturer sometimes stocks
more than a competitive manufacturer (ii). A monopolistic manufacturer can coordinate
the availability of all products, i.e., she can optimally increase stocks of a product i,
while simultaneously decreasing the availability of products j 6= i. Under competition,
a manufacturer cannot accomplish this availability trade-off since she cannot force her
competitors to reduce production quantities. This contingency occurs for a product i
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if, e.g., manufacturers believe that yi exerts only a limited influence on the wholesaler’s
stocking decision for the other products x?−i, or if product i offers a very high profit
margin to the manufacturer. Markets with such heterogeneous product margins and
substitution structures typically include no-name and brand products (Ailawadi and
Keller, 2004), or functionally heterogeneous products. If the effects of yi and y−i on
µi(y) are additive separable for all i, or if (4.9) holds and all products are homogeneous
and symmetric, then production increases under competition for all products, yc ≥ ync.
Note that the results of Proposition 4.8 are similar to the findings of Netessine
and Rudi (2003) for competition among wholesalers. However, these two results are
based on different problem characteristics because the wholesaler’s and manufacturer’s
problem differ structurally in numerous ways. In particular, substitution dynamics and
demand characteristics are completely different. Therefore, Proposition 4.8 establishes
the transferability of the previous results to the manufacturer stage.
Naturally, as manufacturers’ production quantities change under competition, the
wholesaler also adjusts his stocking levels. This implies that end-of-season invento-
ries at the manufacturer, i.e., excess inventories after trading, change if competition is
introduced. These residual inventories are a direct consequence of the vertical infor-
mation asymmetry within the supply chain. If manufacturers could perfectly predict
the wholesaler’s best-response stocking levels, they would never produce more than this
quantity, and they would never incur end-of-season inventories. We now examine how
the manufacturers’ end-of-season inventories change under competition. We denote the
end-of-season inventory level of product i at the manufacturer by Ii(y) = yi − x?i (y).
Proposition 4.9. Let y′ ≥ y. Then, the following relations between I(y′) and I(y) hold:
(i) Ii(y
′) ≥ Ii(y) for at least one product i.
(ii) There are instances of the Supply Game where Ii(y
′) < Ii(y) for some product
i.
Proposition 4.9 sheds light on the influence of competition on end-of-season invento-
ries. As an illustration, consider the extreme case of Proposition 4.8 that all production
quantities increase under competition, yc ≥ ync. Interestingly, despite the monotonic
influence on production quantities, competition does not necessarily increase each prod-
uct’s end-of-season inventories. In fact, for some products, end-of-season inventories may
decrease. In such a case, the wholesaler increases his stocking level for product i more
than the manufacturer increases yi. Again, this result is explained by both, the mutual
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interdependency of all products and the occurrence of indirect substitution cascades as
described in Proposition 4.2. In summary, even when competition exerts a monotonic
effect on the manufacturer’s production quantities, supply chain inefficiencies due to
asymmetric information need not change monotonically.
4.4.4. Numerical Illustration
We now provide a small numerical example to illustrate our theoretical findings. Con-
sider a market with three substitutable products. For the sake of analytical tractability,
suppose that each manufacturer believes that the wholesaler’s stocking levels follow a
truncated exponential distribution with support on [0, yi] and rate parameter λi(y), i.e.,
Φi(χi, y) = [1−exp(−λi(y)χi)]/[1−exp(−λi(y)yi)]. Note that our framework also works
for any other common distribution such as truncated Normal, Gamma, or Weibull dis-
tributions, but at the cost of analytical tractability.
Following Definition 4.1, beliefs about the wholesaler’s stocking level for product i
should be stochastically increasing in yi. Thus, each rate parameter λi(y) is a function
of the manufacturers’ production quantities which decreases in yi. To be specific, we




j 6=i kjiyj + 1. By setting
kji ≥ 0, we ensure that products are economic substitutes. We work with the inverse of yi
and not with −yi to ensure non-negativity of λi(y). Intuitively, each scale parameter kji
captures the magnitude of the effect that yj exerts on the wholesaler’s stocking decision
for product i.
The truncated exponential distribution together with the specification of λi(y) en-
sures that each manufacturer holds rational beliefs as described in Definition 1. It is
readily shown that µi(y) = [1/λi(y)]− [yiexp(−λi(y)yi)/(1− exp(−λi(y)yi))]. Thus, the
influence of yi and y−i on µi(y) is not additive separable. For all investigated scenarios,
we assume ci = 2 for all i. All other parameter values wi and kji are given in Table
4.1. Parameters include high and low margin cases, and high and low substitution rates.
Note that for all displayed parameter values, a unique Bayesian (Nash-) Stackelberg
equilibrium exists. For each scenario, we display the optimal production decisions for
both supply chain configurations.
Obviously, in a market with symmetric price and substitution structure, production
quantities increase if manufacturer competition is introduced (A). In our example, this
result remains valid if there is no substitution to one product in the assortment (B). If
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Table 4.1.: Optimal production decisions.
Parameters Optimal decision











A 8 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.61
B 8 8 8 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.20 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.60 0.60
C 8 8 8 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.69 0.69
D 8 8 8 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.20 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.85
E 10 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.00 0.66 0.66 1.07 0.45 0.45
F 11.9 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.24 0.62 0.62 1.89 0.06 0.06
G 11.9 10 7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.20 0.91 0.44 1.44 0.59 0.05
instead one product does not influence the other products, i.e., there is no substitution
away from the product, then production quantities decrease for this product under
competition (C,D). In such a scenario, a monopolistic manufacturer optimally increases
the availability of the product at the cost of decreasing the other products’ availability.
In a competitive environment, a manufacturer cannot coordinate product availability
across multiple products because her competitors are reluctant to lose market shares. In
the agrochemical market, these heterogeneous substitution structures arise due to the
coexistence of single- and multi-purpose products. While single-purpose products are
specialized to fight a single plant disease such as mildew, multi-purpose products are
effective against a wider class of diseases. Naturally, substitution from the specialized to
the more general product is likely to occur, because the specialized product lies within
the application range of the general product. In contrast, the specialized product need
not be useful for a customer initially desiring the more general product.
In our example, production quantities for high margin products decrease under
competition, while production increases for low and medium margin products (E,F,G).
We observe this behavior because a monopolistic manufacturer shifts as much demand
as possible to the high margin products, thereby reducing the other products’ availabil-
ity to a minimum. In contrast, a similar demand shift cannot be accomplished under
competition. Note that under a monopolistic manufacturer, low margin products almost
disappear from the market, while competition ensures product diversity (F,G). Concur-
rent with intuition, overall production increases with the introduction of manufacturer
competition.
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4.5 Discussion
In this essay, we analyzed the optimal production and stocking decisions of a manu-
facturer and a wholesaler in a two-stage supply chain with upstream competition and
vertical information asymmetries. We characterize the wholesaler’s equilibrium stocking
levels and show that these quantities are non-monotonic in both, available production
quantities and customer substitution rates. For the upstream stage of the supply chain,
we derive the equilibrium production quantities of a monopolistic and a competitive man-
ufacturer, respectively. We find that production quantities for some products decrease
if upstream competition is introduced. Furthermore, we highlight the counter-intuitive
situation that some end-of-season inventories at the manufacturer decrease although
initial production quantities increase.
We can identify two key drivers for these non-monotonic and partially counter-
intuitive results: (i) customer substitution; and (ii) the products’ heterogeneity. If there
exists no substitution among products (αij = 0 for all i, j), then our n-product problem
can be decomposed into n single-product problems. As such, there is no interaction
between products and therefore, direct and indirect substitution dynamics disappear.
Similarly, if products are completely homogeneous, then products affect one another
only in monotonic and intuitive ways. Thus, our counter-intuitive results only occur in
markets which exhibit a minimum level of substitution and product heterogeneity. The
agrochemical market, e.g., is shaped by these heterogeneities. Brand manufacturers and
(former) patent holders compete with generic products, which oftentimes differ in price
and profit margins. Furthermore, the market’s substitution structure is skewed due to
the coexistence of single- and multi-purpose products.
4.5.1. Robustness
We now discuss the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the information
and supply chain structure. Additionally, we delineate opportunities for future research.
Concerning the information structure, we assume that (i) manufacturers’ production
quantities y are verifiable, and (ii) Φi(χi, y) is differentiable in y. Verifiability of y ensures
that the wholesaler determines his stocking levels under complete information about the
manufacturer’s strategy. Consequently, we can ignore communication issues between
manufacturer and wholesaler. This is not true if y is unverifiable and thus privately
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observed by the manufacturer. In this case, the manufacturer’s equilibrium behavior
consists of her production and communication strategy, which introduces an additional
inference problem for the wholesaler. Under strategic communication, the manufacturer
need not pursue a truth-telling strategy or she may not communicate any information at
all, which inherently changes the timing of the game to simultaneous moves. Whether
the structure of our results remains valid under such a scenario, or not, is an interesting
question for future research.
The differentiability of a manufacturer’s belief, Φi(χi, y), about the wholesaler’s
subsequent stocking level is a common assumption in the literature (Cachon and Lar-
iviere, 1999; O¨zer and Wei, 2006), but clearly, it is not ensured that, in equilibrium,
x?i (y) is actually differentiable. Nevertheless, it is guaranteed that x
?
i (y) is continuous
in y. In a similar framework, Cachon and Lariviere (1999) show numerically that the
differentiability assumption provides an excellent approximation. We therefore expect
our results to be robust with respect to the differentiability of beliefs.
Concerning the supply chain structure, we assume that competition occurs only
among manufacturers. This assumption is inspired by our observations in the agro-
chemical market, but obviously, a general extension of our framework is to allow for
downstream competition as well. Such an extension introduces two additional issues
that need to be incorporated into the model. First, manufacturers need to decide on al-
location mechanisms for their production quantities in case that total orders exceed the
available production quantities. Second, these allocation schemes induce the wholesalers
to place strategic orders. The influence of such allocation problems on supply chains in
substitution markets should be a focal point of future work.
Additionally, under downstream competition, the assumption that Φi(χi, y) is dif-
ferentiable in y becomes much more problematic. At some point, competition among
heterogeneous wholesalers can induce competitors to leave the market. Generally, such
a market exit induces discontinuities in the stocking levels of the remaining competitors.
Therefore, the differentiability assumption provides a less reliable approximation. Nev-
ertheless, we expect that such an approximation will still yield structurally valid results,
even under downstream competition.
To deepen our understanding of the repercussions that substitution exerts on the
individual supply chain members, more fundamental extensions should also be examined.
In particular, we believe that future models should incorporate pricing decisions, but
this might come at the expense of analytical tractability. Another aspect that deserves
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future research is the introduction of multiple time periods. In such a setting, initial
product demand changes dynamically over time because a substituting customer may
change his product preferences due to product unavailability.
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Proofs of Chapter II
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The firm’s optimal resource allocation for each realization of e
and m maximizes the expected market value of both products, Eθ[νi + νj|m, e], where
the expectation is taken over the products’ market potential. The proof now proceeds
by comparing the expected market value, Eθ[νi + νj|m, e] = Pr(θi = G|mi, ei)νi(θi =
G) + Pr(θj = G|mj, ej)νj(θi = G), of different resource allocation schemes for all e and
m, given that managers truthfully reveal their signals, m = s.
Suppose that both managers evaluate their products with only low effort, e = (l, l).
Then, the firm’s posterior belief about the products’ market potential is identical to its
prior belief for all possible recommendations m, i.e., Pr(θi = G|mi, ei = l) = 1/2. If
the firm now invests all its resources in a single product, then the product’s expected
market value is v2/2. If, in contrast, the firm splits resources evenly, then each product’s
expected market value is v1/2, yielding a total expected market value of v1. Since by
assumption v2 < 2v1, the firm’s optimal resource allocation for e = (l, l) and any m is
to split resources evenly.
Now, consider the case where both managers exert a high-effort product evaluation,
e = (h, h). In this setting, the firm revises its prior beliefs according to the received
recommendations. In particular, if the firm receives a good recommendation for product
i, then its posterior belief about product i having a good market potential is q, while
a bad signal implies a posterior belief of 1− q. Assume that the firm receives identical
recommendations for both products, mi = mj, which implies that posterior beliefs for
both products are also identical. Hence, the firm maximizes the expected market value
of both products by simply optimizing νi(θi = G) + νj(θj = G), which is largest if the
firm splits resources evenly. Now, assume to the contrary that recommendations are
different, e.g., m = (g, b). Allocating all resources to product i gives an expected market
value of qv2, while after an even split of resources both products have a total expected
market value of qv1 + (1 − q)v1 = v1. It follows that the firm optimally allocates all
resources to product i if q > v1/v2, and splits resources evenly otherwise.
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Lastly, we analyze the asymmetric evaluation effort strategy, e = (h, l). As the
recommendation for product j is uninformative, the firm allocates resources only based
on the recommendation for product i. If the firm receives a good recommendation for
product i, then allocating all resources to this product has an expected market value
of qv2. Splitting resources evenly, however, results in a total expected market value of
qv1 + v1/2. Thus, it is optimal for the firm to split resources evenly only if q < qa,
and allocate all resources to product i otherwise. Now, suppose the recommendation for
product i is bad. Then, it is never optimal to allocate both resources to product i. An
even split of resources yields an expected market value of (1− q)v1 + v1/2, whereas the
expected market value is v2/2 if all resources are allocated to product j. Hence, the firm
optimally splits resources evenly only if q < qb and allocates all resources to product j
otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We prove this proposition in three steps: First, we derive the
integrated firm’s expected profit for any possible product evaluation strategy, which is
a necessary requirement for our subsequent discussion. Second, we establish that the
integrated firm never chooses an asymmetric evaluation strategy if q < qa, which helps
us to simplify the exposition. Lastly, we discuss the threshold functions ζ1, ζ2, and ζ3
to conclude the proof.
Profit derivation: As a preliminary, note that the integrated firm’s optimal resource
allocation is identical to the decentralized firm’s allocation strategy, and thus given by
Lemma 2.1. This is true because if managers truthfully reveal their private signals, m =
s, then the decentralized firm can perfectly infer the received signals. Accordingly, the
integrated and decentralized firm are endowed with the same information upon making
their resource allocation decisions, and therefore, these decisions must be equivalent.
If the firm exerts only low evaluation efforts for both products, then it eventu-
ally splits its resources evenly across the two products. Therefore, product i’s ex-ante
expected market value is
Eθ[νi|e = (l, l)] = Pr(θi = G|si = g)Pr(si = g)v1 + Pr(θi = G|si = b)Pr(si = b)v1 = v1
2
.
Due to the symmetry of products and since no evaluation costs are incurred, the firm’s
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ex-ante expected profit becomes
Πfb(e = (l, l)) = v1. (A.1)
In contrast, if the firm decides to exert high-effort evaluation for both products,
then it incurs evaluation costs for both of them. However, the firm now uses the addi-
tional information to revise its initial beliefs about the true market potential of the two
products. If q ≤ v1/v2, then the firm always splits resources evenly, and following (A.1),
expected profits are v1 − 2c, which can never be optimal. In contrast, if q > v1/v2, the
firm may either split resources evenly if products are equally promising, or it may fund
only one of the products. The ex-ante expected market value of product i is then












Πfb(e = (h, h)) =
1
2
(qv2 + v1)− 2c. (A.2)
Lastly, the firm also has the option to pursue an asymmetric product evaluation
strategy by exerting high effort for only one product. Again, the derivation of the firm’s
ex-ante expected profit is similar to the above cases, and we need to consider that the
optimal resource allocation changes with q (see Lemma 2.1). Thus, the firm’s ex-ante
expected profit is a piecewise function of q:
Πfb(e = (h, l)) =

v1 − c if q < qb
1
4
(v2 + (2q + 1)v1)− c if qb ≤ q < qa
1
4
(2q + 1)v2 − c if q ≥ qa.
(A.3)
Asymmetric evaluation: We now show that, in optimum, the firm never chooses an
asymmetric product evaluation strategy if q < qa. First, for q < qb, Π
fb(e = (h, l)) =
v1 − c < v1 = Πfb(e = (l, l)) because c > 0 by assumption. Thus, if q < qb, the
firm always prefers low-effort product evaluation over an asymmetric product evaluation
strategy. Second, high-effort product evaluation for only one product is also a dominated
strategy if qb ≤ q < qa, i.e., Πfb(e = (h, l)) > max{Πfb(e = (l, l)),Πfb(e = (h, h))} is a
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contradiction. In fact, Πfb(e = (h, l)) > Πfb(e = (h, h)) if and only if c > (2q − 1)(v2 −
v1)/4 ≡ c; and Πfb(e = (h, l)) > Πfb(e = (l, l)) if and only if c < [(2q− 3)v1 + v2]/4 ≡ c.
However, c < c, which yields the desired contradiction.
Optimal product evaluation: The threshold functions ζ1, ζ2, and ζ3 are derived by
pairwise comparing (A.1) with (A.2), (A.2) with (A.3), and (A.1) with (A.3), respec-
tively. Accordingly, the firm exerts high-effort product evaluation for both products if
c ≤ min{ζ1, ζ2}, high effort for only one product if ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3, and low effort for both
products if c > max{ζ1, ζ3}. Additionally, we note that qc ≥ qa if and only if qc ≤ 1.
(i) If q < qc, then ζ3 < ζ1 < ζ2. It follows that the firm chooses e
∗
fb = (h, h) for
c ≤ ζ1, and e∗fb = (l, l) otherwise.
(ii) If q ≥ qc, then ζ2 < ζ1 < ζ3. Now, the firm chooses e∗fb = (h, h) for c ≤ ζ2,
e∗fb = (h, l) for ζ2 < c ≤ ζ3, and e∗fb = (l, l) otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we revisit the decentralized
firm’s optimal resource allocation. Second, we show that a compensation scheme that
induces asymmetric effort levels is never incentive compatible in effort.
Resource allocation: If both managers are truth-telling, but pursue different evalu-
ation effort levels under decentralization, then the firm is not able to observe the man-
agers’ product evaluation strategy. In fact, the firm does not know whether e = (h, l)
or e = (l, h). This ambiguity has to be taken into account when allocating resources to
products (Lemma 2.1 is not straightforward applicable because now, e is not known).
Suppose both managers send the same recommendation, mi = mj. If recommen-
dations are good, then both products have a total expected market value of qv1 + v1/2,
if the firm splits resources evenly, while the expected market value of a product that
receives all resources is (qv2 +v2/2)/2. Similarly, if both recommendations are bad, then
an even split of resources yields an expected market value of (1− q)v1 + v1/2, while the
expected market value of a product that received all resources is ((1 − q)v2 + v2/2)/2.
Thus, it is optimal to split resources evenly across products if recommendations are
identical, because v2 < 2v1 by assumption.
Now, assume managers give different recommendations, e.g., m = (g, b). Dedicating
all resources to the well recommended product i gives an expected market value of
(qv2 +v2/2)/2, whereas splitting resources evenly generates an expected market value of
v1. Therefore, the firm invests all resources in product i if q ≥ (4v1 − v2)/2v2 and splits
resources evenly otherwise.
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Incentive compatibility: By using the firm’s optimal resource allocation, we can now
conclude this proof by showing that any truth-inducing contract with ei 6= ej is never
incentive compatible in effort. This implies that one manager always wants to deviate
from his current effort level, such that ei 6= ej cannot be part of any equilibrium.
If q < (4v1 − v2)/2v2, then the firm always allocates resources equally to both
products. Hence, exerting high-effort product evaluation is costly for a manager, but
does not affect the firm’s allocation decision. Therefore, each manager’s expected utility
is always largest under low-effort product evaluation.
If q ≥ (4v1 − v2)/2v2, then the firm allocates all resources to a single product if
recommendations are unequal, and splits resources evenly elsewise. Without loss of
generality, assume that manager i and j exert high and low effort, respectively, and
suppose that a truth-inducing contract exists in this setting. Then, this contract must
be incentive compatible in effort, i.e.,
Ui(ei = h|ej = l,m = s) ≥ Ui(ei = l|ej = l,m = s)
Uj(ej = h|ei = h,m = s) < Uj(ej = l|ei = h,m = s).
Manager i’s effort incentive compatibility condition is satisfied if 2ksqv2 − 8c ≥ ksv2,
while manager j’s constraint is true if 2ksqv2 − 8c < ksv2. Obviously, both constraints
contradict each other, and thus, there exists no contract that induces asymmetric effort
levels in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. This proof consists of three steps. In a first step, for clarity, we
derive the decentralized firm’s optimization problem (2.1) - (LL). Step two determines
the optimal wage contract that induces high-effort product evaluation and truth-telling
by both managers. Finally, the third step provides the sensitivity analysis which com-
pletes the proof.
Optimization problem: The expected profit of the decentralized firm (2.1) is similar
to the integrated firm’s expected profit (A.2). However, under decentralization the
firm does not directly incur the effort costs c, but it has to incentivize its managers
to exert high effort by paying a bonus scheme k = (ks, kp). Thus, the firm maximizes
its expected profits, which comprise of the products’ expected market value net the
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managers’ compensation, i.e.,
Π(k) = (1− ks − kp)Eθ[νi + νj|k]
= (1− ks − kp)1
2
(qv2 + v1).
We now turn to the truth-telling constraints (IC-g) and (IC-b). Manager i truthfully
reveals a good signal if and only if
Ui(mi = g|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) ≥ Ui(mi = b|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj),
where the manager assumes that the firm will optimally allocate resources according
to the managers’ recommendations. Similarly, truthful revelation of a bad evaluation
outcome is guaranteed if and only if
Ui(mi = b|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) ≥ Ui(mi = g|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj).
The required utilities are derived as follows:
Ui(mi = g|si = g, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) = P(sj = g)
(
ksEθi [νi|k,m, e] + kpEθj [νj|k,m, e]
)








By a structurally identical argument, we can develop the three remaining utility func-
tions:





(ksqv1 + kp(1− q)v1) ,
Ui(mi = g|si = b, ei = ej = h,mj = sj) = 1
2
(ks(1− q)v1 + kpqv1) + 1
2
(ks(1− q)v2) ,





(ks(1− q)v1 + kp(1− q)v1) .
Canceling out identical terms gives the desired truth-telling conditions (IC-g) and (IC-
b). In a next step, we analyze the firm’s effort incentive condition (IC-e). Manager i
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exerts high-effort product evaluation if and only if
Ui(ei = h|ej = h,m = s) ≥ Ui(ei = l|ej = h,m = s),
where the manager assumes that the firm will optimally allocate resources according to
the managers’ recommendations, and that recommendations are truthful. These utilities
are given by
Ui(ei = h|ej = h,m = s) = P(si = g, sj = g)
(
ksEθi [νi|k,m, e] + kpEθj [νj|k,m, e]
)
+ P(si = g, sj = b)ksEθi [νi|k,m, e]
+ P(si = b, sj = g)kpEθj [νj|k,m, e]
+ P(si = b, sj = b)
(















(ks(1− q)v1 + kp(1− q)v1)− c,

























v1 + kp(1− q)v1
)
.
Collecting terms yields the firm’s effort incentive constraint (IC-e). Lastly, the firm
needs to ensure that ks, kp ≥ 0, since managers are protected by limited liability. If
bonuses were negative, then there would exist situations that result in negative wages,
which is strictly forbidden by assumption.
Optimal wages: Maximizing the firm’s expected profit (2.1) is equivalent to mini-
mizing ks+kp. Now, for the contract to be incentive compatible in effort, (IC-e) requires
that ks ≥ 8c(2q−1)v2 . Additionally, the contract is truth-inducing if and only if ks and kp
simultaneously satisfy (IC-g) and (IC-b). Rewriting these constraints gives
(1− q)v2
q(v2 − v1) + (1− q)v1 · ks ≤ kp ≤
qv2
q(v2 − v1) + (1− q)v1 · ks. (A.4)
Thus, to minimize ks + kp, we choose ks as small as possible and then determine kp by
transforming the left inequality in (A.4) into an equality. Therefore, the firm’s optimal
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(2q − 1)(q(v2 − v1) + (1− q)v1) ,
which also satisfies the limited liability constraint (LL).
Sensitivity: By (A.4), k?p =
(1−q)v2
q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1 · k?s . Now, to show that k?s > k?p, it is
sufficient to verify that (1−q)v2
q(v2−v1)+(1−q)v1 < 1. Rearranging this inequality and solving for
q assures that the condition holds for any q > 1/2. Thus, k?s > k
?
p.
To show that k?p/k
?
s is concave decreasing in q, convex decreasing in v2, and constant





q(v2 − v1) + (1− q)v1




s is independent of





= − v2(v2 − v1)





= − 2v2(2v1 − v2)(v2 − v1)






= − (1− q)(2q − 1)v1






2q(2q − 1)(1− q)v1
(q(v2 − v1) + (1− q)v1)3 > 0,
which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The manager: The contract scheme k? incentivizes each man-
ager to exert high-effort product evaluation. Thus, each manager’s expected utility is
given by Ui(k
?) = E[wi(k?)]− c. Since, ex-ante, both products have the same expected
market value, Eθ(νi|k?) = (qv2 + v1)/4, manager i’s expected wage is
E[wi(k?)] = (k?s + k?p)Eθ(νi|k?) = cφ1φ2,
where φ1 =
2qv2+2v1
(2q−1)v2 > 1 and φ2 =
v2−(2q−1)v1




?) = φ1φ2 − 1 > 0,
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which implies that Ui(k
?) is linear increasing in c.
Note that Ui(k
?) is decreasing in q and v2, respectively, if and only if the manager’s























Thus, a sufficient condition for decreasing expected wages is that both, φ1 and φ2 de-
crease in q and v2, respectively. Evaluating first-order derivatives concludes this proof:
∂
∂q
φ1 = − 2v2 + 4v1
(2q − 1)2v2 < 0,
∂
∂q
φ2 = − v2(v2 − v1)
(qv2 − (2q − 1)v1)2 < 0,
∂
∂v2





φ2 = − (1− q)(2q − 1)v1
(qv2 − (2q − 1)v1)2 < 0.
The firm: The firm’s expected profit is given by (2.1) and can be rewritten as
Π(k?) = 2 · (1− k?s − k?p)Eθ(νi|k?).
A simple algebraic argument shows that both, k?s and k
?
p are decreasing in q and v2, and
increasing in c, whereas Eθ(νi|k?) is increasing in q and v2, and constant in c. Thus, it
follows immediately that Π(k?) is increasing in q and v2, and decreasing in c.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Substituting k?s and k
?
p into (2.1) and comparing expected prof-
its with Π(k = (0, 0)) = v1 immediately gives ζ4. Using previous notation, we can rewrite
ζ4 = ζ1(φ1φ2)
−1, and we know that φ1φ2 > 1. Thus, ζ4 < ζ1. Next, by example, we
prove the claim that there exist parameter values such that ζ4 > ζ2. Assume q = 1 and






v1 = ζ2, which establishes the result.
Moreover, ζ4 is convex increasing in q. To see why note that first- and second-order
partial derivatives of ζ1, φ
−1
1 , and φ
−1

































(v2 − (2q − 1)v1)3 > 0.
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Since all first-order partial derivatives are strictly positive, we conclude that ζ4 is strictly
increasing in q. Convexity is now established through evaluation of the second-order

































The first two terms are strictly positive, so it remains to verify that the third term is





2v1 − v2 .







2v1 − v2 .
Thus, ζ4 is convex increasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. To prove the claim, we first note that the firm’s expected prod-
uct development scope depends on the chosen product evaluation strategy as follows: (i)
If e = (l, l), then n = nfb = 2; (ii) if e = (h, l), then n = 1; and (iii) if e = (h, h), then
n = nfb = 1.5. Combining this observation with Propositions 2.1 and 2.4 concludes the
proof. For q < qc,
n− nfb =

0 if c < ζ4
0.5 if ζ4 ≤ c ≤ ζ1
0 if ζ1 < c,
and for q ≥ qc,
n− nfb =

0 if c < min{ζ2, ζ4}
0.5 if min{ζ2, ζ4} ≤ c < max{ζ2, ζ4}
1 if max{ζ2, ζ4} ≤ c ≤ ζ3
0 if ζ3 < c.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6. We prove this proposition by investigating the firm’s percent-
age profit loss, ηp, for all five regions indicated in Figure 2.4.
(i) efb = e? = (h, h): If both products are evaluated with high effort under integra-
tion as well as decentralization, then
ηp = 1− Π(e
?)







It can be readily verified that the second fraction in (A.5) is equal to one, and by applying
Proposition 2.3, the first fraction increases in q and v2, and decreases in c. It follows
immediately that ηp decreases in q and v2, and increases in c.
(ii) efb = e? = (l, l): Since neither evaluation costs nor wages are paid in this
scenario, the firm’s percentage profit loss is zero, i.e., ηp = 1− v1v1 = 0.
(iii) efb = (h, h), e? = (l, l): In this case,
ηp = 1− v11
2
(qv2 + v1)− 2c > 0,
which obviously increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
(iv) efb = (h, l), e? = (l, l): In this case,
ηp = 1− v11
4
(2q + 1)v2 − c > 0,
which obviously increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
(v) efb = (h, l), e? = (h, h): If the decentralized firm over-invests in product evalu-
ation, then we can express the firm’s percentage profit loss as
ηp = 1− Π(e
?)







As already argued in case (i), the first fraction increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
Now, by noting that over-investment can only occur if c > ζ2, we can readily verify that
the same results also hold for the second fraction. Thus, ηp decreases in q and v2, and
increases in c.
To conclude the proof, it is sufficient to note that the decentralized firm under-
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invests in product evaluation in cases (iii) and (iv), while an over-investment occurs
solely in case (v).
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Recall from the previous proof that if the integrated and de-
centralized firm choose the same product evaluation strategy, i.e., efb = e?, then Π(e?)+
Ui(e
?) + Uj(e
?) = Πfb(efb). Now, applying Propositions 2.1 and 2.4 immediately shows
that the percentage welfare loss, ηw, is zero if and only if the decentralized and integrated
firm choose the same product evaluation strategy.
If the decentralized firm over-invests in product evaluation, e? = (h, h), compared
to the integrated firm, efb = (h, l), then, by the argument in case (v) of the Proof of
Proposition 2.6, the percentage welfare loss,






decreases in q and v2, and increases in c.
If the decentralized firm under-invests in product evaluation, e? = (l, l), compared
to the integrated firm, efb = (h, h) or efb = (h, l), then the percentage welfare loss,
ηw = 1− v11
2




(2q + 1)v2 − c > 0,
increases in q and v2, and decreases in c.
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Proofs of Chapter III
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It can readily be verified that the first, second, and last term in
(3.1) are concave in x for given t. Therefore, to establish the Lemma, it remains to show
that the third term is also concave in x. Since this term is integrable and has a bounded
derivative, we can interchange the expectation and derivative operators, and the result





(p− c)− w(B − t)+ − h
∫ B+L
max {t,B}
1{Qt−Qτ≤x}dτ − (p− s)1{Qt≤x}
]
= (p− c)− w
∫ bu
t











fQt−Qτ |max {t,B}≤τ≤B+L(x) · P(max {t, B} ≤ τ ≤ B + L)dτ
< 0,
where fZ is the density function of the random variable Z. The strict inequality follows
from p > s, and the assumption that density functions are strictly positive.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. For t ≥ b, the first-order partial derivatives of ΠL(x, t) with respect
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1{Qt−Qτ≤x}dτ − (p− s)1{Qt≤x}
]
= (p− c)− h
∫ b+lu
t











− (p− s) (−Q′t1{Qt≤x})]
= h
[
xP(L > t− b)−
∫ b+lu
t
dt(Qt −Qτ ≤ x, L > τ − b)dτ
]
− (p− s)dt(Qt ≤ x).
(B.2)
Equating both derivatives to zero and rearranging terms concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (a) Suppose h = 0. In this case, by (B.2), we have ∂ΠL(x,t)
∂t
=
−(p − s)dt(Qt ≤ x) ≤ 0 for all x and t. Since expected profits decrease in the firm’s
inventory timing, the firm introduces the product immediately at the start of the selling
season, t? = b. By definition of Qτ , t
? = b implies that Qt? = Q. Inserting the optimal
inventory timing t? in (B.1) and equating to zero determines the firm’s optimal inventory
scale, x?, through P(Q ≤ x?) = p−c
p−s . In addition, since p > c, it is easy to verify that
ΠL(x
?, t?) > 0. Thus, market exit is always a suboptimal strategy.
(b) Suppose h > 0. In a first step, we show that instant product availability is
never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. Assume to the contrary that t? = b is




≤ 0. However, since A(τ) is
continuously differentiable, we know that A′(b) = 0. Thus, by the definition of dt(·), we
have db(·) = 0 and it follows that ∂ΠL(x,t)∂t
∣∣∣
t=b
= hx > 0 for all x > 0, which yields the
desired contradiction. Finally, we establish that for x = 0, instant product availability
is never better than a market exit. This is obvious because with x = 0 the firm cannot
generate positive profits which makes market exit the (weakly) preferred strategy.
Now, since instant product availability is never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy,
the firm either chooses a risk exploitation inventory strategy or market exit. Compar-
ing the firm’s expected profits under both inventory strategies determines the optimal
strategy. Note that market exit leads to zero profits. Thus, the firm prefers the risk
exploitation strategy defined in Lemma 3.2 if and only if ΠL(x
?, t?) ≥ 0. To estab-
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lish the existence of the threshold function h(c), we make use of the Implicit Function
Theorem. Specifically, the Implicit Function Theorem asserts the following for a con-
tinuously differentiable function ΠL with coordinates (c, h), and a point (c
′, h′) with
ΠL(c
′, h′) = 0: If ∂ΠL(c
′,h′)
∂h
is invertible, then there exists an open set U containing c′, an
open set V containing h′, and a unique continuously differentiable function h : U → V ,




< 0, we can conclude that there exists a unique
continuously differentiable function h(c) such that the optimal inventory strategy is risk




















(p− c)− w(B − t)+ − (p− s)1{Qt≤x}
]
= (p− c)− w
∫ bu
t





(o+ wx)1{B≥t} − (p− s)
(−Q′t1{Qt≤x})]
= (o+ wx)P(B ≥ t)− (p− s)dt(Qt ≤ x). (B.4)
Equating to zero and rearranging terms concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (a) Suppose o = w = 0. By (B.4), we have ∂ΠB(x,t)
∂t
= −(p −
s)dt(Qt ≤ x) ≤ 0 for all x and t. Now, we can conclude the proof with a structurally
identical argument to the proof of Proposition 3.1(a), which we omit for conciseness.
(b) Suppose o + w > 0. In a first step, we show that instant product availability
is never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. Assume to the contrary that t? = 0




≤ 0. However, from the
definition of A(τ) it follows readily that A′(0) = 0 almost surely, implying that d0(·) = 0




= o + wx > 0 for all x > 0, which yields the desired
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contradiction. Finally, we establish that for x = 0, instant product availability is never
better than a market exit. This is obvious because with x = 0 the firm generates negative
profits which makes market exit the preferred strategy.
Now, since instant product availability is never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy,
the firm either chooses a risk exploitation inventory strategy or market exit. Comparing
the firm’s expected profits under both inventory strategies determines the optimal strat-
egy. Again, market exit leads to zero profits. Thus, the firm prefers the risk exploitation
strategy defined in Lemma 3.3 if and only if ΠB(x
?, t?) ≥ 0. Similar to Proposition





Implicit Function Theorem ensures that there exists a unique continuously differentiable
function o(c) such that the optimal inventory strategy is risk exploitation if o ≤ o(c),











E [(B − t?)+] < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof is equivalent to the proofs of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3; i.e.,
we need to take first-order partial derivatives of Π(x, t) with respect to x and t, and
equate them to zero. In fact, the derivatives of the revenue, earliness cost, and salvage
cost terms can be derived as before. However, differentiating the holding cost term with
respect to t is now much more involved. We will therefore demonstrate how to obtain
this important derivative. First, we rewrite the holding cost term (while suppressing h)





























It(τ)1{τ≤b+L}dτ |B = b
]
fB(b)db.
Next, we derive the first-order partial derivative with respect to t by applying Leibniz’s
formula, by interchanging the expectation and derivative operators, and by noting that
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∂It(τ)
∂t
















dt (Qt −Qτ ≤ x, τ ≤ B + L,B ≤ t) dτ − xP (B ≤ t ≤ B + L) .
Based on this analysis, we can now state the first-order partial derivatives of Π(x, t) with





(p− c)− w(B − t)+ − h
∫ B+L
max {t,B}
1{Qt−Qτ≤x}dτ − (p− s)1{Qt≤x}
]



















= (o+ wx)P(B ≥ t)− (p− s)dt(Qt ≤ x)
+ h
[
xP (B ≤ t ≤ B + L)−
∫ bu+lu
t




Proof of Proposition 3.3. The proof follows exactly the same steps as in Propositions
3.1 and 3.2.
(a) Suppose o = w = h = 0. By (B.6), we have ∂Π(x,t)
∂t
= −(p − s)dt(Qt ≤ x) ≤ 0
for all x and t. From hereon, the proof follows exactly the same steps as in Proposition
3.1(a).
(b) Suppose that o + w + h > 0. In a first step, we show that instant product
availability is never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy. Assume to the contrary that
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≤ 0. However, from
the definition of A(τ) it follows readily that A′(0) = 0 almost surely, implying that
d0(·) = 0 almost surely. Thus, ∂ΠB(x,t)∂t
∣∣∣
t=0
= o + wx > 0 for all x > 0, which yields the
desired contradiction. Finally, we establish that for x = 0, instant product availability is
never better than a market exit. This is obvious because with x = 0 the firm generates
negative profits which makes market exit the preferred strategy.
Now, since instant product availability is never the firm’s optimal inventory strategy,
the firm either chooses a risk exploitation inventory strategy or market exit. Comparing
the firm’s expected profits under both inventory strategies determines the optimal strat-
egy. Again, market exit leads to zero profits. Thus, the firm prefers the risk exploitation
strategy defined in Lemma 3.4 if and only if Π(x?, t?) ≥ 0. Similar to Proposition
3.1(b), because Π(x, t) is continuously differentiable and ∂Π(x
?(c,o),t?(c,o),c,o)
∂o
< 0, the Im-
plicit Function Theorem ensures that there exists a unique continuously differentiable
function o(c) such that the optimal inventory strategy is risk exploitation if o ≤ o(c),










E [(B − t?)+] < 0.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The proof proceeds by comparing the results of Proposition 3.3
with a classical newsvendor’s optimal inventory scale. Due to the independence of Q and
S, a classical newsvendor’s optimal inventory scale, xNV , satisfies P(Q ≤ xNV ) = p−cp−s .
By Proposition 3.3(a), if the firm chooses an instant product availability, t? = 0,
then the optimal inventory scale is given by P(Q ≤ x?) = p−c
p−s . This optimality condition
is identical to the classical newsvendor’s condition, and therefore x? = xNV .
By Proposition 3.3(b), if the firm chooses a risk exploitation inventory strategy,
then the optimal inventory scale is determined by (3.8). Since the second and third
term on the left-hand side of (3.8) are strictly positive, it follows immediately that
P(Qt? ≤ x?) < p−cp−s , or equivalently, P(Qt? ≤ x?) < P(Q ≤ xNV ). Since, by construction,
Qt? is stochastically smaller than Q, we know that in optimum, P(Q ≤ x?) ≤ P(Qt? ≤
x?) < P(Q ≤ xNV ). These inequalities, however, can only hold if x? < xNV .
Finally, if the firm exits the market, then x? = 0 < xNV , which concludes the
proof.
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Proof of Corollary 3.2. We are interested in the full differential of the expected profit,





















= 0. Similarly, if the


















. Finally, it is straightforward to show
that ∂Π(x,t)
∂α
is positive for α ∈ {p, s}, and negative for α ∈ {c, o, w, h}.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. (a) Suppose w = o = h = 0. Then, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.4 imply
that for any t, the firm’s optimal inventory scale solves P(Qt ≤ x?) = p−cp−s . Noting that
Qt stochastically decreases in t establishes the desired result.
(b) We prove this result by constructing a situation where x?(t) increases in t. The









Lemma 3.1 and the optimality of x?(t), we know that ∂
2Π(x?,t)
∂x2
< 0. Thus, to establish
our result, we need to find a situation where ∂
2Π(x?,tˆ)
∂x∂t
> 0 for some tˆ. Assume h = 0,
w > 0, tˆ < bu, and A
′(tˆ) = 0 for any realization of (Q,B,L). Intuitively, this corresponds




= wP(B ≥ tˆ) > 0, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. (a) For fixed t, we are interested in the differential of the optimal













0. By differentiating (B.5) with respect to α, it is easy to verify that the resulting
cross-partial is positive for α ∈ {p, s}, negative for α ∈ {c, w, h}, and zero for α = o.
(b) Structurally equivalent to part (a).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Suppose the firm’s optimal inventory strategy is risk exploita-
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∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂t2 −∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂t
−∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂t ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x2
)
.
Since (x?, t?) maximizes Π(x, t), the Hessian, H, evaluated at this point must be negative
definite, and therefore, det(H) > 0. Additionally, by optimality, ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x2 ≤ 0
and ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂t2 ≤ 0. By Lemma 3.6, we also know that ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂α is
negative (zero) for α = c (α = o), and ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂t∂α is zero (positive) for α =
c (α = o). Incorporating this information in (B.7) shows that ∂x?/∂c ≤ 0, and
∂t?/∂c ≥ (<)0 if ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂t ≤ (>)0. Similarly, ∂t?/∂o ≥ 0, and ∂x?/∂o ≤ (>)0
if ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂t ≤ (>)0. In Lemma 3.5, we have already established that there exist
situations where ∂2Π(x?, t?)/∂x∂t is either positive or negative. Thus, in general, x? is
not monotonic in o, and t? is not monotonic in c.
Finally, it remains to verify that x? (t?) also decreases in c (increases in o) if the firm’s
optimal inventory strategy is either instant product availability or market exit. However,
this follows immediately from Proposition 3.3. Hence, ∂x?/∂c ≤ 0 and ∂t?/∂o ≥ 0.
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Proofs of Chapter IV
Proof of Lemma 4.1. For given x−i, the first-order and second-order derivatives of ΠW (x)
with respect to xi are
∂ΠW (x)
∂xi
=ui − (ui + oi)P(Dsi < xi)−
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijP(Dsj < xj, Di > xi)
=ui − (ui + oi)P(Dsi < xi)−
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijP(Dsj < xj|Di > xi)P(Di > xi)
∂2ΠW (x)
∂x2i






fDi(xi)P(Dsj < xj|Di > xi)− αijfDsj |Di>xi(xj)P(Di > xi)
]
,
i = 1, . . . , n, with fY being the density function of random variable Y . By rearranging
terms, ΠW (x) is concave in xi if and only if









(uj + oj)αijfDi(xi)P(Dsj < xj|Di > xi)
(C.1)
for all x. To prove the lemma, we construct a scenario for which (C.1) is violated for
some x.
Let η > 0, and for given xi, let Xη(xi) be the set of stocking levels x−i such
that P(Dsj < xj|Di > xi) ≥ 1/(n − 1) and fDsj |Di>xi(xj) < η. Note that for any xi,
Xη(xi) is non-empty because P(Dsj < xj|Di > xi) → 1 and fDsj |Di>xi(xj) → 0 for
xj → ∞. For all j 6= i, let (i) αji = 0, i.e., Dsi =st Di; (ii) αij = 1/(n − 1); and (iii)
(uj + oj) = (1 + ν)(ui + oi)(n − 1), ν > 0. Further assume that Di ∼ Normal(µi, σi)
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Given these assumptions,
(ui + oi) [fDi(xi) + (1 + ν)η]









(uj + oj)αijfDi(xi)P(Dsj < xj|Di > xi) ≥ (ui + oi)(1 + ν)fDi(xi). (C.3)
By (C.1)-(C.3), it follows that ΠW (x) is not concave in xi, if for some xi,






Since Di is normally distributed, we can choose xi such that fDi(xi) = 1/(σi
√
2pi) and







Proof of Proposition 4.1. Consider the maximization problem Py. Since ΠW (x) and all
constraints are continuously differentiable in x, and all constraints are linear in x, there





− λi = 0 (C.6)
λi(x
?
i − yi) = 0 (C.7)
x?i − yi ≤ 0 (C.8)
x?, λ ≥ 0, (C.9)
i = 1, . . . , n. Now, suppose x? is a directionally largest optimal solution.
Case 1: x?i < yi. For (C.7) to hold, we need λi = 0, which implies by (C.6) and
(4.2) that x?i = xˆi(x
?
−i).
Case 2: x?i = yi. We need to show that yi ≤ xˆi(x?−i). Suppose to the contrary
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that there exist situations where x?i = yi > xˆi(x
?
−i). By (4.2), xˆi(x
?
−i) is the wholesaler’s
optimal stocking level if he is unrestricted in his stocking decision for product i. Now,
if this stocking level is also feasible for the bounded problem Py, then it must also be




−i) < yi = x
?
i which is a contradiction.
Combining Cases 1 and 2 for all i yields x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Given x−i, the wholesaler’s optimization problem is now single-
dimensional in xi. Thus, to analyze how xˆi(x−i) changes in xj, j 6= i, we apply the







Due to the optimality of xˆi(x−i), we know that ∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂x2i ≤ 0. Furthermore,
analysis of the cross-partial yields
∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)
∂xi∂xj









P(Dsk < xk|Di > xˆi)P(Di > xi).
By construction, Dsk, k 6= j, is stochastically decreasing in xj and so, ∂P(Dsi < xˆi)/∂xj ≥
0 and ∂P(Dsk < xk|Di > xˆi)/∂xj ≥ 0 for all k 6= i, j. Additionally, Dsj does not dependent
on xj and therefore ∂P(Dsj < xj|Di > xˆi)/∂xj ≥ 0. Combining these arguments gives




Thus, it follows that xˆi(x−i) ≥ xˆi(x′−i).
(ii) Consider a three-product scenario with products denoted by i, j, and k, respec-
tively, and suppose that the density functions of Di, Dj, and Dk are strictly positive on
R+. This implies that the inequality in Part (i) is strict because ∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂xi∂xj <
0. Assume αjk > 0, αki > 0, and any other substitution rate to be zero. Note that xˆi(xj)
depends on xj only indirectly through xˆk(xj). We now prove the lemma by a sequential
argument.
First, we analyze the direct effects between the three products. By Part (i), x′j > xj
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implies xˆk(x
′
j) < xˆk(xj), and thus xˆi(x
′
j) > xˆi(xj). Second, to complete the proof, we
need to show that an increased stocking level for product i also leads to a decreased
stocking level for k, but this is again just an application of Part (i).
Accordingly, since direct and indirect substitution effects point in the same direc-
tion, we can conclude that xˆi(xj) < xˆi(x
′
j).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (i) Suppose x?j(y
′) < x?j(y). This can never happen because
x?j(y
′) is feasible in Py, but by assumption, it is dominated in Py by x?j(y). This must












−j) ≥ xˆi(x?j(y′), x?−j).
It follows immediately that x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?j(y), x?−j), yi} ≥ min{xˆi(x?j(y′), x?−j), yi} =
x?i (y
′).
(iii) Assume yi large enough so that it never constrains the wholesaler. This as-
sumption ensures the applicability of Lemma 4.2 because we are guaranteed to find
an interior solution to the wholesaler’s optimization problem. Hence, by Part (i) and





′)) for some i 6= j.
Thus,
x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi} = xˆi(x?−i(y)) < xˆi(x?−i(y′)) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y′)), yi} = x?i (y′)
for some i 6= j.
















In a first step, we show that ∂ΠW/∂αji ≥ 0 for all i and j, i 6= j, i.e.,
∂ΠW
∂αji
= (ui + oi)E
[
(Dj − xj)1{Dsi<xi,Dj>xj}
] ≥ 0. (C.10)
This is true, since the term under the expectation in (C.10) is non-negative.
In a second step, we investigate the indirect effects of αji on ΠW . If x is optimally
adjusted, then, for all k, ∂ΠW/∂xk = 0 if x
?
k < yk and ∂x
?
k/∂αji = 0 if x
?
k = yk. Thus,
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dΠW/dαji = ∂ΠW/∂αji ≥ 0 for all i and j, if x is adjusted optimally.








Due to the optimality of xˆi(x−i), we know that ∂2ΠW (xˆi(α), α)/∂x2i ≤ 0. In addition,
the cross-partial ∂2ΠW/∂xi∂αji is explicitly given by
∂2ΠW
∂xi∂αji
= −(ui + oi) ∂
∂αji
P(Dsi < xˆi), (C.12)
for all j 6= i. By construction, Dsi = Di+
∑
k 6=i αki(Dk−xk)+. Thus, Dsi is stochastically
increasing in αji. It follows that ∂P(Dsi < xi)/∂αji ≤ 0, and hence, ∂2ΠW/∂xi∂αji ≥ 0.
Now, by (C.11), (C.12), and the optimality of xˆi(x−i), ∂xˆi(x−i)/∂αji ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.











= −(ui + oi)
[
P(Dsi < xi, Dj > xˆj) + αji
∂
∂αji
P(Dsi < xi, Dj > xˆj)
]
, (C.14)
where ∂P(Dsi < xi, Dj > xˆj)/∂αji ≤ 0.
We therefore prove the lemma by providing an example. Consider a two-product
portfolio with heterogeneous initial demands Di ∼ Uniform(0, 1) and Dj ∼ Beta(2, 1),
i.e., Fj(xj) = x
2
j . Assume all other parameters to be symmetric across products. To







] ≤ 0, and ∂2ΠW/∂xj∂αji = 125x3i /24 ≥ 0.





> 0 for xi > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The total differential of the optimal stocking level for product
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To prove the claim, we make use of the following two properties: For all k, (a) if x?k = yk,
then ∂x?k/∂αji = 0; and (b) if x
?
k < yk, then ∂x
?
k/∂αji = ∂xˆk/∂αji. From Lemma 4.3(ii),
for some i and j, i 6= j, there are instances of Py where ∂xˆj/∂αji > 0. Combining this
result with property (b), we find that there are instances of Py with ∂x
?
j/∂αji > 0. Now
assume that x?k = xˆk = yk for all k 6= j, yielding dx?j/dαji = ∂x?j/∂αji > 0 and the
proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. To prove the desired result, we make use of the inverse distribution
function Φ−1i (ρi, y), ρi ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, Φi(χi, y) = ρi and Φ−1i (ρi, y) = χi. Note
that the assumptions on rational beliefs imply ∂2Φ−1i (ρi, y)/∂y
2
i ≤ 0. Further, Φi(0, y) =
0 and Φi(yi, y) = 1.





χidΦi(χi, y)− ciyi = wi
∫ yi
0
(1− Φi(χi, y))dχi − ciyi. (C.15)




(1− ρi)dΦ−1i (ρi, y)− ciyi = wi
∫ 1
0










Proof of Proposition 4.5. Assuming rational beliefs, each manufacturer’s expected profit
given her competitors’ production quantities is
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wiµi(y)− ciyi.
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− ci = 0,
and the result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. A pure-strategy manufacturer Nash equilibrium exists if (i)
each manufacturer’s strategy space is a non-empty, compact and convex set, and (ii) each
manufacturer’s profit function ΠMi is continuous in y and quasi-concave in yi (Debreu,
1952). Lemma 4.4 together with our assumptions ensures that these conditions are
satisfied. Thus, there exists at least one pure-strategy manufacturer Nash equilibrium.
To derive our uniqueness conditions, we rely on the fundamental results of Rosen
(1965). In particular, Theorem 2 in Rosen (1965) asserts that the manufacturer Nash
equilibrium defined by (4.5) is unique if (i) ΠMi is twice continuously differentiable in
y for all i, and (ii) σ(y, δ) =
∑n
i=1 δiΠMi(yi|y−i) is diagonally strictly concave for some
fixed δ > 0. While condition (i) is guaranteed by our assumptions, we need some more
definitions to verify condition (ii).







and denote by G(y, δ) the Jacobian of g(y, δ) with respect to y, i.e.,







Now, Theorem 6 in Rosen (1965) states that σ(y, δ) is diagonally strictly concave if
G(y, δ) is negative definite for all y ∈ ×i[0, yi] ⊆ [0, K]n and some fixed δ > 0. Thus, the
manufacturer Nash equilibrium is unique if, for some δ > 0, G(y, δ) is negative definite
for all y.
Negative definiteness of G(y, δ): Denote by GT (y, δ) the transposed of G(y, δ). A
basic result in fundamental algebra states that G(y, δ) is negative definite if its sym-
metric part Gsym(y, δ) =
[
G(y, δ) +GT (y, δ)
]
/2 is negative definite. This is true if all
eigenvalues of Gsym(y, δ) are negative. Note that, due to Definition 4.1, all elements
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of Gsym(y, δ) are non-positive. Hence, by the Gershgorin Circle Theorem (see Varga,

















i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, Gsym(y, δ) is negative definite if, for all i, ubi < 0. This is true

























By choosing δi = 1/wi > 0 for all i, (C.16) reduces to (4.6), which proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. If ΠW (x) is jointly concave in x, then the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking level x?(y) is unique for any given y. In addition, under the conditions of
Proposition 4.6, the manufacturer Nash equilibrium yc is also unique. It follows that
(x?(yc), yc) defines the unique Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in the competitive
scenario of the Supply Game.



















i = 1, . . . , n. Rearranging terms and satisfying the optimality conditions gives (4.8).
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Proof of Corollary 4.2. If ΠW (x) and ΠM(y) are jointly concave in x and y, respectively,
then the wholesaler’s optimal stocking level given y, x?(y), and the manufacturer’s opti-
mal production quantity ync are both unique. Thus, in the non-competitive scenario of
the Supply Game, (x?(ync), ync) defines the unique Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4.8. We start this proof with a preliminary result that is useful in





















(i) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume yc < ync. Now, by comparing and



























to be true. By assumption (4.9), the second term on the right-hand side of (C.18) is














By (C.17) and concavity of µi with respect to yi, this can only be true if y
c
i ≥ ynci , a
contradiction to our initial assumption.
(ii) An example provides the proof. Assume manufacturers’ beliefs about the whole-
saler’s stocking levels for products j 6= i are independent of the production quantity of
product i, i.e., µj(yi, y−i) = µj(y−i) for all j 6= i. Hence, ∂µj/∂yi = 0 for all j 6= i.
Assume further that ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂yi∂yj > 0 for all j 6= i. Then, the inequality in (C.17)
becomes strict.
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Now, assume yc−i ≥ ync−i; otherwise the proof would already be complete. By (C.17) and





Proof of Proposition 4.9. (i) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let y′ ≥ y and sup-
pose I(y′) < I(y). Then, for arbitrary i,
y′−i − x?−i(y′) < y−i − x?−i(y). (C.20)
As an immediate consequence of (C.20), we know that x?−i(y
′) > x?−i(y). Now, by




′)) ≤ xˆi(x?−i(y)), (C.21)
and recall that x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}.
If xˆi(x
?
−i(y)) ≥ yi, then Ii(y) = yi − yi = 0, and thus Ii(y′) ≥ Ii(y). If, to the
contrary, xˆi(x
?
−i(y)) < yi, then applying (C.21) yields
Ii(y) = yi − xˆi(x?−i(y)) ≤ y′i − xˆi(x?−i(y′)) = Ii(y′).
Accordingly, Ii(y
′) ≥ Ii(y); a contradiction to our initial assumption that I(y′) < I(y).
(ii) The proof is an application of Proposition 4.2. Suppose y′ = y + εej, ε > 0, for
arbitrary j. Then, by Proposition 4.2(iii), there exist situations where x?i (y
′) > x?i (y)
for some i 6= j. Thus,
Ii(y
′) = y′i − x?i (y′) < y′i − x?i (y) = yi − x?i (y) = Ii(y).
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